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Conference Foreword 
The annual Security Congress, run by the Security Research Institute at Edith Cowan University, 
includes the Australian Information Security and Management Conference. Now in its fourteenth year, 
the conference remains popular for its diverse content and mixture of technical research and 
discussion papers. The area of information security and management continues to be varied, as is 
reflected by the wide variety of subject matter covered by the papers this year.  
  
The conference has drawn interest and papers from within Australia and internationally. All submitted 
papers were subject to a double blind peer review process.  Fifteen papers were submitted from 
Australia and overseas, of which ten were accepted for final presentation and publication. 
 
We wish to thank the reviewers for kindly volunteering their time and expertise in support of this 
event. We would also like to thank the conference committee who have organised yet another 
successful congress. Events such as this are impossible without the tireless efforts of such people in 
reviewing and editing the conference papers, and assisting with the planning, organisation and 
execution of the conferences.  
 
To our sponsors also a vote of thanks for both the financial and moral support provided to the 
conference. Finally, thank you to the administrative and technical staff, and students of the ECU 
Security Research Institute for their contributions to the running of the conference. 
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Congress Organising Committee 
Congress Chair:  Professor Craig Valli 
Committee Members: Dr Zubair Baig 
Mr David Cook 
   Mr Michael Crowley 
   Mr Peter Hannay 
   Professor Bill Hutchinson 
   Dr Ahmed Ibrahim 
Dr Mike Johnstone 
   Dr Patryk Szewczyk 
   Dr Krishnun Sansurooah 
   Associate Professor Andrew Woodward  
Congress Coordinator:  Ms Emma Burke 
   
 
3
Table of Contents  
 
CELESTIAL SOURCES FOR RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION…………………………………………………… 
 
   5 
Erin Chapman, Jerina Grewar, Tim Natusch  
A PRIVACY GAP AROUND THE INTERNET OF THINGS FOR OPEN- SOURCE PROJECTS……………….   14 
Brian Cusack, Reza Khaleghparast  
AN ANALYSIS OF CHOSEN ALARM CODE PIN NUMBERS & THEIR WEAKNESS AGAINST A 
MODIFIED BRUTE FORCE ATTACK…………………………………………………………………………………………… 21 
Alastair Nisbet, Maria Kim  
USING GRAPHIC METHODS TO CHALLENGE CRYPTOGRAPHIC PERFORMANCE……………………….. 30 
Brian Cusack, Erin Chapman  
A HYBRID BEHAVIOUR RECOGNITION AND INTRUSION DETECTION METHOD FOR MOBILE 
DEVICES…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 37 
Ashley Woodiss-Field  
UNDERSTANDING AND COMBATTING TERRORIST NETWORKS: COUPLING SOCIAL MEDIA 
MINING WITH SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS…………………………………………………………………………… 48 
Benn Van Den Ende  
FUTURE OF AUSTRALIA’S ETP: SCRIPT EXCHANGE, SCRIPT VAULT OR SECURE MOBILE 
ALTERNATIVE…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 52 
Kyaw Kyaw Htat, Patricia A H Williams, Vincent McCauley  
ACCELERATING NTRUEncrypt FOR IN-BROWSER CRYPTOGRAPHY UTILISING GRAPHICAL 
PROCESSING UNITS AND WEBGL……………………………………………………………………………………………. 60 
Dajne Win, Seth Hall, Alastair Nisbet  
A SURVEY OF SOCIAL MEDIA USERS PRIVACY SETTINGS & INFORMATION DISCLOSURE…………. 67 
Mashael Aljohani, Alastair Nisbet, Kelly Blincoe  
AN INVESTIGATION OF POTENTIAL WIRELESS SECURITY ISSUES IN TRAFFIC LIGHTS……………….. 76 
Brian Bettany, Michael N. Johnstone, Matthew Peacock  
 
4
CELESTIAL SOURCES FOR RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION 
 
 
Erin Chapman, Jerina Grewar, Tim Natusch 
Digital Forensics Research Laboratories, Institute for Radio Astronomy and Space Research 
Auckland University of Technology, Auckland, New Zealand 
erinchapman@xtra.co.nz, jmgrewar@gmail.com 
  
Abstract 
In this paper, we present an alternative method of gathering seed data for random number generation (RNG) in 
cryptographic applications. Our proposed method utilises the inherent randomness of signal data from celestial 
sources in radio astronomy to provide seeds for RNG. The data sets were collected from two separate celestial 
sources, and run through the SHA-256 algorithm to deskew the data and produce random numbers with a 
uniform distribution. The resulting data sets pass all tests in the NIST Statistical Test Suite for random data, with 
a mean of 98.9% of the 512 total bitstreams from the two sources passing all tests in the NIST suite, as well as 
further testing in R. These results are on par with the control set generated using Java’s SecureRandom 
function. An explanation of the sources, the data processing and detailed results of each of the tests are 
presented.  
 
Keywords  
Random number generation, RNG, random noise, NIST, seeds, cryptographic hash functions, SHA-256, secure 
hashing algorithm, radio astronomy, signal noise, data analysis, astronomy, analytics, random sequences  
INTRODUCTION 
The use of random number generators is a fundamental element of cryptographic systems. The creation of 
random initialisation vectors and keys are of utmost importance in security applications which utilise encryption 
on a day-to-day basis globally. The means by which these numbers are generated varies from application to 
application, however many are created through algorithmic processes, such as the Monte Carlo methods (Gentle, 
2006). Many different options for producing truly random numbers through nature have been proposed, utilising 
the signal noise of lasers (Applegate et al., 2015), or implementing quantum chaotic generators (Akhshani, 
Akhavan, Mobaraki, Lim, & Hassan, 2014). In this paper we propose an alternative method for seeding RNGs 
which utilises the inherent randomness of the signal noise produced by radio telescopes, with a scheme which 
implements the Secure Hashing Algorithm (SHA) as a deskewing algorithm for randomness extraction. The 
output of this scheme passes statistical tests for randomness in both R and the NIST Statistical Test Suite (NIST 
STS), and offers a new method of collecting random numbers for use in seeding cryptographic applications. This 
research offers applications in the implementation of secure random number generators such as SHA-256 (Dang, 
2015), which rely on irreproducible, statistically random seed data for security. The proposed scheme for 
gathering seed data could be utilised in the application of cryptographic protocols for secure systems, as our 
results show it presents a high-level of performance paired with rapid data collection. 
The structure of this paper is as follows: in Part I relevant prior research is discussed briefly, and an overview of 
the area is given. In Part II the operation and theory of radio telescopes and the related signal noise is explained. 
Part III then offers our data sources and method for the collection of the output. Part IV enumerates the method 
by which the gathered data was processed using SHA-256 for deskewing purposes and our results based on the 
outcome of the statistical testing completed. Finally, Part V offers our conclusions and suggestions for further 
research. 
RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION AND RANDOM SEEDS 
The generation of random numbers for security applications is an ever-present concern. Utilising hardware to 
generate these numbers is a well-developed area, in which the main aim is to mitigate the statistical properties of 
the data, and to determine whether there is any way for an adversary to estimate the likely output of a particular 
system. As the algorithms used in these applications are themselves public knowledge, the security rests in the 
seed, for deterministic systems, and in the data source, for non-deterministic RNG. 
Schemes such as the secure RNG developed by Lo Re, Milazzo, & Ortolani (2014) make use of the inherent 
properties of hardware components to collect data. In the system proposed by Lo Re et al. (2014) each node of 
the wireless sensor network is capable of generating random numbers, which are provided to the leader node.  
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Other systems have utilised the properties of quantum mechanics to implement RNGs. Lunghi et al. (2015) 
offered a quantum RNG which maintained consistent monitoring of the output to ensure continuing statistical 
randomness.  Cicek, Pusan, & Dundar (2014) presented a method for True Random Number Generation (TRNG) 
through a chaos system, which gave excellent performance when tested by the NIST Statistical Test Suite, with 
the bitstream resulting from the scheme split into 1 Mbit blocks.    
In generating random numbers for everyday use in cryptographic applications, most systems use pseudo-random 
number generators (PRNGs), which function through algorithmic means. This type of RNG requires a seed, 
which in itself should be statistically random and irreproducible, because if the seed is compromised, then the 
resulting random numbers are also compromised. Implementations such as the Java function call SecureRandom 
use a mixture of truly random and pseudorandom data, often starting with a TRN as the function seed. Other 
PRNGs use statistical methods such as Monte Carlo techniques, or Lorenz systems (Lynnyk, Sakamoto, & 
Celikovsky, 2015). In the case of Lynnyk, Nakamoto and Celikovsky (2015), a TRN was used to produce the 
seed for the algorithmic PRNG. In Barker and Kelsey (2015), the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) family is 
recommended for use in deterministic random number generation using irreproducible and statistically random 
seeds. 
RADIO ASTRONOMY 
Radio Astronomy is the discipline of science using antennae or radio telescopes to detect the emission of celestial 
sources in the electromagnetic frequency range of 106 Hz to 109 Hz (Shuch, 2013). Radio telescopes allow 
astronomers to peer through not only the layers of our atmosphere but in frequencies beyond the human eye’s 
capability into interstellar clouds of particles, thereby determining the chemistry and physics behind the 
astronomical phenomena of our universe (Dougherty, 2011). 
At 30.48 metres in diameter, the Warkworth 2 antennae was licensed from Telecom and converted in 2010 by the 
Institute for Radio Astronomy and Space Research (IRASR) of Auckland University of Technology (AUT) 
(Murphy, 2010). This took it from an international telecommunications satellite dish to a radio telescope as part 
of the Warkworth Radio Astronomical Observatory (WRAO). The telescope is a reflector on a wheel and track 
with a beam waveguide feed (Woodburn et al., 2015). NEC Corporation of Japan originally built the dish for the 
Post Office (later Telecom) in 1984 as part of Warkworth Satellite Earth Station, which is located 5 km south of 
Warkworth and 60 km north of Auckland, in New Zealand’s North Island (Ministry of Culture and Heritage, 
2013). 
The majority of astronomical objects give off radiation for astronomers to detect, but some have much greater 
emissions including pulsars, quasars, certain nebulae, and radio galaxies (The Editors of Encyclopædia 
Britannica, 2016). In 1931, Karl Jansky worked on improving the operation of transoceanic radio links for Bell 
Laboratories. The “steady hiss static” that he recorded became the origin of radio astronomy, and now the 
strength, or spectral flux density of a radio source is measured in Janskys (Jy), where 1 Jy = 10-26 Wm-2Hz-1 
(Jansky, 1979). 
Radio astronomy signals are inherently random, “a specific property of astronomical observations is that they 
cannot be repeated under the exact same conditions” (Junklewitz, 2014, p.13). The astrophysical source signal 
and the telescope system noise are both Gaussian distributed (Burke and Graham-Smith, 2002). The signal 
available at the output of a radio telescope consists of the combination of system noise (internally generated 
noise), a 2.73 Kelvin component from Cosmic Microwave Background Radiation, noise power from the celestial 
source of interest (the “signal”) and typically interference signals picked up from the surrounding terrain 
(Campbell, 2002). The influence of the amplifier increases the amplitude of both “signal” and noise whilst a 
linear (frequency independent) response of the receiving system will preserve the statistical distribution of the 
input signal and result in a Gaussian output signal (Haykin, 2009). 
Figure a: Random Process (Hsu, 2013, p. 393) 6
 Due to the random nature of all the processes contributing to the final receiver output signal it is not normally 
possible to distinguish between the various components from a study of the output signal.  Using the sum of all 
these signals, and recognizing the implausibility of another party replicating the uniqueness of the system noise 
component(s) confers a distinct advantage for recording a unique source of randomly generated data (Burke and 
Graham-Smith, 2002). An illustrated example of how our recorded signal is a statistically random process is 
shown in Figures A and B. 
 
DATA COLLECTION 
The data used in this research was collected at the WRAO. The two sources chosen for data collection were the 
bright Maser 309.92+0.47, hereafter referred to as “G309” (coordinates 13h 50mins 41.78s RA and -61º 35’ 10.2” 
DEC) and M17 (18h 20mins 26s RA and -16º 10' 36" DEC) from the J2000 epoch. G309 is a methanol maser; an 
interstellar cloud of methanol (CH3OH) molecules that emits at a frequency of approximately 6.7 GHz (in the 
laboratory/rest frame). Photons are released when these particular molecules change their angular momentum via 
a transition between allowed quantum rotational states. In the J/A+A/432/737 General Catalogue of 6.7GHz 
Methanol Masers, G309 has a flux of approximately 780 Jy (Pestalozzi and Chrysostomou, 2005). The methanol 
maser is 5.3 kiloparsecs (kpc) or 17.2 kilo-lightyears (kly) distant from Earth (Phillips, Norris, Ellingsen, & 
McCulloch, 1998). M17 is a nebula containing an open cluster of stars called NGC6618. The cluster is an HII 
star-forming region, an ionised cloud of Hydrogen that radiates by a thermal emission process. M17 is at 1.6 kpc 
distance and observed total flux is some 687 Jy (Povich et al., 2007). 
Signal from the right hand circular polarisation (RCP) of the telescopes C band receiver was processed by a chain 
of backend electronics consisting of a “front end” Low Noise Amplifier (LNA), a down-converter that selected 
and mixed a 6.5-6.8 GHz “RF/Sky” band of signal down to a 300 MHz wide band centred on 825 MHz and 
finally to an RTL-SDR for further filtering, amplification and digitisation of the signal. Down conversion to the 
Intermediate Frequency (IF) band at 825 MHz is achieved by selecting the lower side band result of mixing the 
RF/Sky band with a 5.8 GHz signal from a Local Oscillator (LO) locked to the WRAO Hydrogen Maser 
(Woodburn et al., 2015):  
 
The down converted band was conveyed by a short length (≈0.5 m) of coaxial cable that also converted from the 
type N output connector of the C band downconverter to the MCX input of the RTL-SDR. Equipped with a 
RTL2838U chipset the RTL-SDR Software Defined Radio (SDR) dongle was plugged into a USB 2.0 port of a 
Unix based laptop (provided by IRASR) The dongle was tuned to 825 MHz and set to a gain of 40 dB by 
constructing a simple GUI interface in the free GNU Radio Companion (GRC) software package (West, 2006). 
The digitized 8 bit data was interleaved into in-phase (I) and quadrature phase (Q) streams produced by the 
dongle. The raw data streams were processed by a Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) GRC block to produce a 
spectrum for visual monitoring of the recorded signal. The LO was turned on and off, the response assured a 
signal was being recorded from fsky. The actual recording of signals was initiated using appropriate commands 
from the rtl_sdr driver package (obtained from git clone git://git.osmocom.org/rtl-sdr.git). Approximately 400MB 
of raw data was recorded from each of our sources, for ≈ 1 min each, into 2 binary seed files. This data was then 
pre-processed using hex dump into text files each containing a 128 bit line of received data in hexadecimal 
format. 
As part of the process of determining correct operation of the system the telescope was first pointed at Centaurus 
A (NGC5128), a Seyfert galaxy (13h25m27.6s RA, -43d01m09s DEC). A pointing observation was run, stepping 
through a grid of 9 points offset from the nominal position in both azimuth and elevation. The received power 
levels obtained for all offset positions where then subjected to a least squares fit (Gaussian peak on a straight line 
Figure b: Random sequence of data bits 1 or 0 produced by a Random Process 
(Hsu, 2013, p. 393) 
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background) to determine offsets of the flux peak. Offsets of 0.04º in azimuth and 0.03º in elevation where 
determined and then applied to subsequent source observations. With calibration of pointing offsets applied the 
telescope was then focused on G309 and M17 in sequence and data files recorded for analysis as described above. 
RESULTS 
The data collected from the sources G309 and M17 was processed for testing using Java. All processing and 
testing was completed on a Unix-based machine configured with 16GB 1867 MHz DDR3 RAM and a 3.1 GHz 
Intel Core i7 processor. The Java code stripped the index numbering from the lines in the hex dump file, and 
removed all excess white space. Each of the 128-bit lines of data were then individually used as a seed for 
hashing into random numbers. As per the NIST recommendations (Barker & Kelsey, 2015), we utilised the SHA 
family of algorithms for the purpose of randomness extraction, specifically the SHA-256 algorithm (Dang, 2015). 
The output of this process was then written to a binary file for testing purposes. 
The first set of tests performed on our data were completed in R, version 3.3.1, which offers several libraries for 
the analysis of random data. The randtests package created by Mateus & Caeiro (2014) offer tests which examine 
the vector data read through a binary file and offer a p-value as the output. A p-value of greater than then 
significance level a = 0.05 gives the sequence a pass, while a p-value of less than a = 0.05 means the test has 
rejected the null hypothesis. The binary file for each source was read into a vector of integer elements, with 2 
bytes to each integer value. The data was subjected to the Bartels Rank Test (Bartels, 1982), the Cox Stuart Test 
(Cox & Stuart, 1955), the Difference Sign Test (Moore & Wallis, 1943), and the Wald-Wolfowitz Runs Test 
(Wald & Wolfovitz, 1940) for continuous data. In all tests, the p-value result was greater than a, meaning the data 
passed the test. In comparing the two data sets, we found that the data gathered from M17 offered better results 
than that gathered from G309. We speculate that this may be due to the inherent nature of each of the sources, as 
M17 is a weaker and more generally dispersed source than G309. Further investigation is required for a definitive 
resolution to this speculation. 
Table 1 shows the results of the testing for both sources, as well as values generated through Java’s 
SecureRandom function, used as our control group. The control data was similarly hashed with the SHA-256 
algorithm, and read in to integer values 2 bytes at a time. 
 
Table 1: Results of testing in R's randtests package (4 d.p.) 
Test M17 G309 Control 
Bartel’s rank test  0.5922 0.4317 0.5633 
Cox Stuart test  0.7919 0.05636 0.138 
Difference sign test  0.6885 0.4409 0.5945 
Wald-Wolfowitz runs test  0.4372 0.2941 0.353 
The hashed M17 data gave a better performance on the tests than the control group, of the hashed 
SecureRandom numbers, while G309 resulted in the worst performance of the test sets. Table 2 shows the 
entropy values of the data sets, both pre- and post-hashing, which were calculated using the Dirichlet-
multinomial pseudo count model with Bayesian estimates using Laplace’s prior (a=1) in the entropy R package 
(Hausser & Strimmer, 2009). The entropy value of the pre-hashed astronomical data in comparison with the 
control group of the data generated using the SecureRandom function suggests that the use of celestial sources 
provides data with a superior level of entropy for use in cryptographic functions. 
 
Table 2: Data Entropy Values as per R's entropy package (5 d.p.) 
Data set Entropy pre-processing Entropy post-processing 
M17  16.11105 15.92491 
G309  16.10822 15.92499 
Control  15.89529 15.92493 
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The histograms for each of the data sets were also computed, both for the unprocessed stream received from the 
radio telescope, which presents a Gaussian distribution, and for the hashed data, which results in a visibly 
uniform distribution. Figure C shows the histogram for the unprocessed data gathered from M17, while Figure 
D shows the post-hashing data for M17 once it was fed through the SHA-256 algorithm. Figure E meanwhile 
displays the histogram for G309 pre-processing, and Figure F gives the histogram for G309 post-hashing. 
 
Figure c: M17 data distribution frequencies, per one million bits 
 
Figure d: Hashed M17 data distribution frequencies, per one million bits. 
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Figure e: G309 data distribution frequencies, per one million bits. 
 
Figure f: Hashed G309 data distribution frequencies, per one million bits. 
Based on the results of testing in the randtests suite, a second set of testing was conducted using the NIST 
Statistical Test Suite (Rukhin et al., 2010), which conducts 15 tests for randomness in binary data. The binary 
files input to this program were the same ones used for the testing in R, and the bitstream length was set to 
 for 256 streams of data. 
Table 3 gives the results of testing in the NIST STS. All data sets passed all 15 of the tests for randomness, with 
97% or more of the streams passing each. For all data sets the results are within a few percentage points of one 
another, suggesting highly comparable values. For tests such as the non-periodic template matching test, which 
returned multiple results for each data set, the mean value was calculated from all returned values for that test. 
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 Table 3: Results from testing in the NIST Statistical Test Suite (4 d.p.) 
Test 
M17 G309 Control 
p-val % p-val % p-val % 
Frequency 0.7637 99.6094 0.6828 98.8281 0.0835 99.6093 
Block Frequency 0.3012 98.0469 0.4484 98.4375 0.8237 98.8281 
Cumulative Sums 0.7455 100 0.7065 99.2188 0.5834 99.4141 
Runs 0.4711 98.8281 0.6993 98.4375 0.6993 98.8281 
Longest Run of 1s 0.5022 97.2656 0.7637 99.2188 0.4559 100 
Rank 0.9769 99.2188 0.5667 98.8281 0.1167 99.6093 
DFT 0.1681 98.4375 0.2954 99.6094 0.0989 99.2188 
Non-periodic Template Matching 0.4805 98.9627 0.4974 98.9390 0.5262 98.9733 
Overlapping Template Matching 0.1038 98.0469 0.4788 99.2188 0.5194 98.0469 
Universal Statistical 0.0815 99.2188 0.9114 99.2188 0.2320 98.4375 
Approximate Entropy 0.3191 98.4375 0.5914 100 0.9114 97.6563 
Random Excursions 0.5232 99.0783 0.5166 99.2477 0.4923 98.2981 
Random Excursions Variant 0.4301 99.2832 0.6290 98.9712 0.4117 98.9306 
Serial 0.3169 99.2188 0.6696 99.2188 0.4541 99.2188 
Linear Complexity 0.5667 98.0469 0.8092 98.8281 0.2272 99.2188 
Figure G gives the graphed percentages of the NIST STS results for each of the data sources. The overall mean 
of the percentage of bitstreams which pass the tests for the two celestial sources is within 0.02% of the control 
group, with 98.9% of the 512 bitstreams passing the tests. 
 
Figure g: Percentage of bitstreams which passed the NIST testing for each data source. 
The results of the testing suggest that data gathered through radio astronomy may present a viable option for use 
as seeds for cryptographic application. The wide variety in data due to fluctuations in machinery, inconsistent 
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radiation from sources, and interference from satellites and other space junk offers a continuous stream of 
irreproducible random bits. The time taken to gather the data used in the testing, approximately 400MB worth 
for each source, was approximately one minute per source. The resulting performance of the data with the SHA-
256 algorithm shows it may be a viable option for security applications. As such, it offers a new, rapid and 
efficient method of gathering irreproducible seeding for random number generation. 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have presented an alternative method for the collection of seed data for random number 
generators. Utilising the inherent randomness and irreproducibility of radio signal data from celestial sources 
presents what our results appear to show is a viable method for collecting vast amounts of seed data for use in 
RNG. The data sets tested all offered high performance levels in the statistical tests for randomness, over long 
period bitstreams. This suggests that astronomical data retrieved from celestial sources presents a viable option 
for use in implementing secure systems, and cryptographic functions such as SHA-256. With the ever increasing 
demand for secure systems, the need for seed data for random numbers is growing rapidly and our results suggest 
the large volume of data that is available through radio astronomy offers a scheme for addressing this growing 
demand. 
Further research is necessary to determine the most effective use of this type of astronomical data in 
cryptographic applications. Examination of other sources to examine the best types of celestial events to collect 
seed data from, as well as collecting and comparing data from other radio telescopes, would be a prudent next 
step, as would testing the astronomical data with multiple different RNGs for performance. However, the data 
presented in this paper offers a feasible beginning to such research. 
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Abstract 
The Internet of Things (IoT) is having a more important role in the everyday lives of people. The distribution of 
connectivity across social and personal interaction discloses personalised information and gives access to a sphere 
of sensitivities that were previously masked. Privacy measures and security to protect personal sensitivities are 
weak and in their infancy. In this paper we review the issue of privacy in the context of IoT open-source projects, 
and the IoT security concerns. A proposal is made to create a privacy bubble around the interoperability of devices 
and systems and a filter layer to mitigate the exploitation of personal and private information by marketing 
companies.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The rapid development of technical capability to sponsor the Internet of Things (IoT) has also impacted the daily 
lives of millions of people. The ability for devices and applications to provide personal services for millions of 
people on a moment by moment basis, has also removed immediately barriers from personal choices, behaviours 
and habits. The rich information around individuals opens new marketing opportunities and information 
opportunities for third-party exploitation. The question of privacy, concerns access to personal information. In the 
case of IoT private information has the same status as any information and can become readily available to multiple 
layers of interested parties (Weber, 2010). The bigger issue is that much of this information can be collected 
unknown to the end user of the IoT. The concept of the smart home, the smart car, the smart phone and other 
technologies, has introduced a relationship where the gap between the human and the technology is narrowed. Every 
movement, motion and breath of life of the human can be monitored by sensor networks and transmitted across 
multiple layers of interested parties. In a medical applications this may be immensely beneficial (Wan et al., 2013). 
However, the human may resist when they are bombarded by multiple advertising campaigns driven by harvested 
data from behavioural sensors and the invitation materialize in their weakest and strongest emotional moments. 
Privacy and privacy protection is hence a central concern when developing open source projects. 
Challenges however arise in terms of scalability. IoT applications that require large numbers of devices are often 
difficult to implement because of the restrictions on time, memory, processing, and energy constraints (Tan, 2011). 
For example, calculation of daily temperature variations around all of the country may require millions of devices 
and result in unmanageable amounts of data. The deployment of hardware in IoT often has different operating 
characteristics, such as sampling rates and error distributions, interoperability protocols and complex sensors and 
actuators components. All of these factors contribute to the formation of the heterogeneous network of IoT in which 
the data of IoT will also be heterogeneous and require a multiplicity of management systems. IoT not only has the 
same security issues as sensor networks, mobile communications networks and the Internet, but also has its other 
vulnerabilities such as privacy protection, different authentication compliance, access control network configuration 
issues, information storage and management problems, and so on. Data and privacy protection is one of the 
application challenges of IoT (Chen et al, 2009). One risk is of the IoT security is from itself, and the other one 
comes from the related technology of construction and implementation of the network functions. IoT itself is the 
integration of multiple heterogeneous networks. There are compatibility issues between different networks and they 
are prone to security issues. For example, it is difficult to establish the junction of relationship as the relationship of 
trust between nodes is constantly changing and this requires a dynamic solution (Jing et al., 2014). The application 
of IoT directly connects with people’s everyday lives and has application in many different fields, for example: 
patient’s remote monitoring, energy consumption control, traffic control, smart parking systems, inventory 
management, production chains, customization of the shopping at the supermarket, and civil protection. For all of 
the uses, users require the protection of their personal information related to their movements, habits and 
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interactions with other people. They also require their privacy be guaranteed. In the literature, there are some 
attempts to address such problems (eg. Fabian and Gunther, 2009). 
VULNERABILITIES OF IoT 
IoT must ensure the security of all layers. In addition, IoT security should also include the security of whole system 
crossing the perception layer, transportation layer and application layer. The Perception layer includes RFID 
security, WSNs security, RSN security and any others. Transportation layer includes access network security, core 
network security and local network security. In addition there are application layer security concerns such as, 3G 
access network security, Ad-Hoc network security, WiFi security and so on. Different network transmission has 
different technology. The Application layer includes the application support layer and specific IoT applications. The 
security in the support layer includes middleware technology security, cloud computing platform security and so on. 
IoT applications in different industries have different application requirements but each requires similar diligence 
for protective mechanisms (Suo et al., 2013).  
IoT divides into three layers: the perception layer, the transportation layer and the application layer (Tsai et al., 
2014). Each of these layers further resolves into layer elements that differentiate the service provided. In figure 1 a 
full summary is made of the security architecture for IoT.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Security architecture of IoT (Tsai et al., 2014). 
The technical architecture of the IoT has an impact on the security and privacy of the participating stakeholders. 
Privacy includes the concealment of personal information as well as the ability to control what happens with the 
information (De Turck et al., 2002; Tan and Han, 2011). The right to privacy can be considered as either a basic and 
inalienable human right, or as a personal right or possession. The attribution of tags to objects may not be known to 
users, and there may not be an acoustic or visual signal to draw the attention of the object’s user. Thereby, 
individuals can be followed without them knowing. Electronic traces are left of their data and movement that remain 
in memory and in cyber- space. Further aggravating the problem (Ukil et al., 2014), it is not anymore only the 
authorities that are interested in collecting the respective data, but also private actors such as marketing enterprises. 
Since business processes are concerned, a high degree of reliability is needed. In the literature, the following 
security and privacy requirements are described (Akyildiz et al., 2002; Evans and Eyers, 2012): 
 Resilience to attacks: The system has to avoid single points of failure and should adjust 
itself to node failures. 
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 Data authentication: As a principle, retrieved address and object information must be 
authenticated. 
 Access control: Information providers must be able to implement access control on the 
data provided. 
 Client privacy: Measures need to be taken that only the information provider is able to 
infer from observing the use of the lookup system related to a specific customer; at least, inference should 
be very hard to conduct. 
These requirements begin to shape the design of a bubble of protection that can be created around a participant in an 
IoT environment. However further work is required to have policies for the erasure of data that relates to personal 
activity, and the protection of all data from parties who wish to exploit it for economic gain (Juels, 2006; Aleaide et 
al., 2013). 
PRIVACY CONCERNS OF IoT 
The fulfilment of customer privacy requirements is a challenging problem. A number of technologies have been 
developed in order to achieve information privacy goals. These Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PET) can be 
described in short as follows (Fabian et al., 2007; Haitao and Ting, 2012): 
 Virtual Private Networks (VPN) are extranets established by close groups of business 
partners. As only partners have access, they promise to be confidential and have integrity. However, this 
solution does not allow for a dynamic global information exchange and is impractical with regard to third 
parties beyond the borders of the extranet. 
 Transport Layer Security (TLS), based on an appropriate global trust structure, could 
also improve confidentiality and integrity of the IoT. However, as each ONS delegation step requires a new 
TLS connection, the search of information would be negatively affected by many additional layers. 
 DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) make use of public-key cryptography to sign 
resource records in order to guarantee origin authenticity and integrity of delivered information. However, 
DNSSEC could only assure global ONS information authenticity if the entire Internet community adopts it. 
 Onion Routing encrypts and mixes Internet traffic from many different sources, i.e. 
data is wrapped into multiple encryption layers, using the public keys of the onion routers on the 
transmission path. This process would impede matching a particular Internet Protocol packet to a particular 
source. However, onion routing increases waiting times and thereby results in performance issues. 
 Private Information Retrieval (PIR) systems conceal which customer is interested in 
which information, once the EPCIS have been located. However, problems of scalability and key 
management, as well as performance issues would arise in a globally accessible system such as the ONS, 
which makes this method impractical. 
 A further method to increase security and privacy are Peer- to-Peer (P2P) systems, 
which generally show good scalability and performance in the applications.  
The following are reviewed literature provides further information regarding the privacy elements in a security 
bubble for an IoT user. In Gurses et al. (2006) a data tagging for managing privacy in IoT is proposed. Using 
techniques taken from the Information Flow Control, data representing network events can be tagged with several 
privacy properties; such tags allow the system to reason about the flows of data and preserve the privacy of 
individuals. Although exploiting tagging within resource-constrained sensor nodes may not be a viable solution 
because tags may be too large with respect to the data size and sensitivity, therefore they generate an excessive 
overhead. Clearly, in this case it is not suitable for IoT. In Huang et al. (2012) a user-controlled privacy-preserved 
access control protocol is proposed, based on context-aware and anonymity privacy policies. The privacy protection 
mechanisms are investigated in the research and the users can control which of their personal data is being collected 
and accessed, who is collecting and accessing such data, and when this happens. In Cao et al., (2011) it is presented 
Continuously Anonymizing streaming data via adaptive clustering (CASTLE). It is a cluster-based scheme which 
ensures anonymity, freshness, and delay constraints on data streams, thus enhancing those privacy preserving 
techniques (e.g., k-anonymity) that are designed for static data sets and not for continuous, unbounded, and transient 
streams.  
In Aleaide (2013), the traditional privacy mechanisms are divided into two categories: Discretionary Access and 
Limited Access. The former addresses the minimum privacy risks, in order to prevent the disclosure or the cloning 
of sensitive data; whereas the latter aims at limiting the security access to avoid malicious unauthorized attacks. 
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Blass et al. (2011) analyses the privacy risk that occurs when a static domain name is assigned to a specified IoT 
node. In this work the authors propose a privacy protection enhanced DNS (Domain Name System) for smart 
devices, which can authenticate the original user’s identity and reject illegal access to the smart device. The scheme 
is compatible with widely used DNS and DNSSEC (Domain Name System Security Extensions) protocols. In 
Elkhiyaoui et al., (2012) a fully decentralized anonymous authentication protocol for privacy-preserving target- 
driven IoT applications is presented. Such a proposal is based on a multi-show credential system where different 
showings of the same credential cannot be linked together, therefore avoiding the generating keys to be discovered. 
The system defines two possible roles for participant nodes. There are users, which represent the nodes originating 
the data, and data collectors, which are responsible for gathering the data from authorized users. Users can 
anonymously and unlinkably authenticate themselves in front of data collectors proving the owning of a valid 
Anonymous Access credential (AAC) encoding a particular set of attributes, established by the system itself. The 
protocol is divided in three phases: set-up, user registration, during which users obtain Anonymous Access 
Credentials, and Credential Proving, during which users prove the possession of a valid AAC to a data collector. 
Such a protocol guarantees: user anonymity, AAC un-linkability (no Data Collector or set of colluding Data 
Collectors can link two transactions to the same User), resistance to user impersonation, faulty and selfish nodes, 
nodes hindering the efficiency, and adversary controlling the Data Collectors. Moreover, such a system relies on a 
fully distributed approach, thus avoiding single point of failure issues. Sunmaker et al. (2010), starting from the 
privacy preserving data mining (PPDM) techniques, and aims at minimizing the sensitive data disclosure probability 
and the sensitive content analysis. In such a work, the user privacy awareness issue is addressed, proposing a 
privacy management scheme which enables the user to estimate the risk of sharing sensitive data. It also aims at 
developing a robust sensitivity detection system, able to quantify the privacy content of the information (Hachem et 
al., 2011). 
USE CASES 
Amazon Echo is a small hands-free wireless speaker that is controlled by voice. The voice command technology 
called “Alexa,” that is inside Amazon Echo is now available on other devices, including the Amazon Fire TV and 
the Amazon Echo Dot and Amazon Tap. These devices exhibit state-of-the-art artificial intelligence that facilitates 
human requirements and human interaction. The concept is grown from a belief that all of human experience may 
be represented by artificial intelligence that is supported by information technology and physical devices. The 
information architecture shows voice command technology that allows the user to manage, control and demand 
personal experiences. The information requirements are managed by sensors, processes and mediating software to 
assure the end user has full connectivity. The IoT systems architecture is design for interoperability across different 
requirements so that the system may be implemented in a home, a motor vehicle, a business, or any other social 
situation. It allows artificial intelligence to control the requirements to satisfy the experience. The concept is that 
Alexa is a human friendly personification that access an access point to a multitude of systems and services. It only 
requires “invocation words” that tell Alexa what Skill or service that is to be activated. The communication requires 
a person to say things like “Alexa, ask Scout to arm my security system” or “Alexa, ask Fitbit what my resting heart 
rate is.” (Wan et al., 2011). 
These use cases of IoT are being developed as open source projects. The developers are working to make it easier 
for third-parties to create Skills that don’t require invocation words at all. For instance, smart home gadgets that 
create Alexa Skills using Amazon’s open application programming interface (API) will get to use existing code and 
standardized Alexa vocabulary for things like lights, switches, and thermostats. In this way the concept of the smart 
home can be built around an IoT plan and human experience may be captured within the technological confines. 
Software such as Alexa are leading the way for creative developers to design and implement this new future. To 
utilize these technologies the user says the word “Alexa,” and from then on the automation monitors everything in 
around the human experience. The concept is strong but the privacy issues still remain. Questions arise regarding 
the supervision of these types of technologies. What happens if Echo is left unsupervised? The technologies are not 
only smart in the sense that they may be communicated to deliver actions services and experiences, but they also 
open the user to a global communication world through the  IoT. The security wireless signals is notoriously 
vulnerable to external influence making the human experience vulnerable to unintended failures. Similarly the 
information generated regarding human behaviour may be recorded and transmitted for commercial interests. 
Marketing for example may become more targeted and better represent a requirement within the human life world. 
To some this may be a benefit but to others it may be deemed invasive (Wang and Wen, 2011).  
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Commercial interests are in the business of selling everything humans need from clothes to groceries, electronics 
goods, gifts and so on. To do that better and more efficiently, they need to know more about their users, their 
friends, their family and social networks. By knowing more about the users’ information, they can better suggest 
new experiences for purchase, and to exactly time when to make the offer. Some of the characteristics collected by 
Alexa (through Echo) are:  
 Unique home occupants: Echo is able to distinguish between the numbers of unique voices in a home and 
to map these voices onto registered users and images of people in the home.   
 Home visitors: Echo can identify and monitor who comes to a home. This is for intended and unintended 
visitors, such as friends and burglars. 
 Gender and age: From voice and photographic data trapped by Echo gender and age may be estimated.  
 Happiness, sadness, anger: emotional states can be monitored and moods such as happiness and sadness, 
anger and delight, and so on can be instantaneously recorded and transmitted.  
 Who is home: Echo can learn patterns of behaviour and detect movement within a home. From this 
learning real-time being is established and also all the interactions are accessible.  
 What we watch and listen to:  Echo can hear everything that is going on that includes preferences for 
television channels, music, statements about products being used, political statements, personal relationship 
statements, and so on, and so on. Such data provides up-to-date information on personal preferences 
although the human may not be conscious that these things are being recorded and matched against 
patterns.  
To create a privacy bubble around the human some security features have already been built into Alexa. However 
the technology can do a lot if left unsupervised that not only includes cleaning the house but also being responsive 
to multiple layers of communication networks from outside of the home. One of the things that has been done to 
quell some of the automation fears is to add a variety of voice controls that put the technology into various sleep 
modes. These types of controls are necessary if the human is to maintain control over their private information that 
includes movements, locations, emotions, habits, and many other personalised information is that would not 
normally be made public. The intrusion of commercial interest into the spaces and the precision with which 
generalizations can be made is a new phenomenon. These are matters that the IoT has introduced (Yang and Fang, 
2011; Jing et al., 2014). 
Privacy security bubble 
Our advocacy in this paper, after the review of the relevant literature, is to have a proximity around technology in 
which the user has protection for the use of their information. To achieve this the user must first be given the rights 
of ownership to their own information. At present within the multiple layers of system the content created within a 
word processor for example may have multiple ownership challenges. The user and creator of the content may not 
be aware of these competing digital rights that are behind what they are doing. In a similar sense people using robot 
vacuum cleaners, automated software on their mobile phone, motor vehicles, hospital services, financial services, 
and so on, may not be aware, and in effect may not have the digital rights to the content that they have created with 
the efficacy of their presence and actions. The privacy requirement in IoT is currently inadequately unaddressed and 
there is a wide set of research issues yet to be investigated. Privacy policies starting from a well-defined model and 
the correspondent development of policies that adequately deal with the scalability and the dynamic environment 
characterizes IoT scenarios are required. Capturing privacy requirements in the very early stages of project 
development is essential for creating public confidence and the adoption of novel IoT systems. Private enterprises 
using IoT technology will have to include these requirements into their risk management plans for governing the 
business activities in general. 
 The IoT is susceptible to intentional and unintentional compromise of information. The complexity of IoT security 
was shown in figure 1. Usual Internet services and other communication services are familiar with protection for the 
transport and application layers. However the IoT introduces the concept of the perception layer. The perception 
layer is made up of networks and nodes that are both social and machine. The mixing of these two elements in the 
perception concept introduces an ambiguity that cannot be easily addressed. The issues of ownership around 
information that is mediated and hosted by machines is much more difficult than the adjudication of common 
property rights. The owners of the machines can lay claim to content, the owners of the software can lay claim to 
content, and the user of the systems and the machines may not be in a position to realise that data has been created 
regarding their own behaviours. The user of IoT experiences and services may also not be in a position to challenge 
the owners of the technology and the hosted services. This therefore creates an imbalance of power that requires 
redress in the fashion that we suggest whereby the user and participant in the IoT environment is given a proximity 
measure in which they hold a primary ownership of the data. The management of such a privacy and security bubble 
can be done by honouring the proximity metric and enforcing it transaction by transaction. This will require the 
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partitioning of data into private and public categories at the point and within the modes of production. The 
proximity measure can be enforced as a contractual arrangement and all the other interested parties must negotiate 
with the human factor for access to any data created within the proximity boundary or from instances within the 
proximity boundary. At present such arrangements are not in place and there is no boundary for privacy. The 
privacy requirement in IoT is currently emerging issue by issue and it will only be when developers are impacted 
financially by end user resistance that the problem will be taken seriously. Consideration is required for building the 
privacy requirement into the front end of a project as a bubble of protection for the end-user. Suitable survey of 
potential end users and full HCI analysis are necessary components of every project. Human factor vulnerability and 
the potential exploitation of the personal data can be treated with these measures.  
CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have reviewed literature that addresses the security and privacy issues in the IoT. The use case of 
Amazon's Alexa devices illustrates open source projects that are currently active and developing. Our consideration 
is to assure that there is a bubble of security and privacy around the user experience so that they are adequately 
protected from exploitation and manipulation by multiple parties who may get access through the technology. It 
would be reasonable to have legislation that prescribes a proximity in terms of a physical metric around and IoT 
user, and anything within that proximity is owned by the user. This would mean that advertising companies and 
others who seek to exploit this information would have to gain permission from the owner of the information before 
they use it. In a hospital situation the patient already signs away these rights but with a mobile device or the sensor 
systems within a motor vehicle, the user is not aware of where their data is going, who was looking at it and who 
may have access to use it. Privacy rights advocates have called for limits on the information that companies can 
collect and use, but the truth is that our privacy is already being breached on a daily basis. However, that does not 
mean that we should voluntarily give up more of our privacy through the purchasing of devices such as the Alexa 
(Echo Dot), automated motor vehicles, or Pokémon applications. 
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Abstract 
Home and commercial alarms are an integral physical security measure that have become so commonplace that 
little thought is given to the security that they may or may not provide. Whilst the focus has shifted from physical 
security in the past to cyber security in the present, physical security for protecting assets may be just as 
important for many business organisations. This research looks at 700 genuine alarm PIN codes chosen by 
users to arm and disarm alarm systems in a commercial environment. A comparison is made with a study of 
millions of PIN numbers unrelated to alarms to compare the results in order to allow a prediction of the alarm 
codes utilised in these systems. Results show that PIN number for alarm codes are often chosen differently than 
other PIN numbers and an analysis of the alarm codes gives an indication of how users choose codes. The codes 
are ranked in various groupings and results show that a non-sequential brute force attack against an alarm 
system using the results of this study greatly reduce the number of codes tried by an attacker before a disarming 
code is discovered. The results can be used to assist users in choosing codes that are less predictable than the 
codes that are often chosen today. 
Keywords 
alarm, PIN, security, crime, brute force attack 
INTRODUCTION 
Alarm systems are commonplace in business and domestic settings. Basic alarms to protect property have been 
recorded as early as 386 BC where animals were used to guard valuables and objects and were placed in 
positions so when disturbed would alert the occupants. Bellis (n.d) states that the history of locks date back 
approximately 4000 years where a lock was found by archaeologists in the Khorsabad near Nivenah. The use of 
alarm systems is twofold: to detect and alert the owners of property that a breach has occurred but equally to act 
as a deterrent to would be offenders. Advertising the presence of an alarm system has shown to be something of 
a deterrent to potential burglars, meaning often that the potential offenders will move on to a premises that does 
not have an alarm. The New Zealand Police report that approximately 143 burglaries are committed each day 
against business and domestic premises, but resolved cases only account for 13% of these break-ins. The 
effectiveness of an alarm system therefore derives from advertising its presence and ensuring its effectiveness if 
an offender is detected.   
The most common method of authenticating to an alarm system is a code or PIN number.  Most alarm systems 
require a PIN number of at least 4 numbers, with many allowing up to 10 numbers or more. Whilst some alarms 
have a lockout feature where multiple wrong codes will disable the keypad for a time or set off the alarm, many 
alarm systems either don’t have this feature or do not have the feature enabled. Whilst longer codes are more 
secure from a brute force attack, most PIN numbers are found to be 4 digits as this is easier to remember than 
longer numbers and humans are incapable of choosing random numbers which leads to a level of predictability 
of those PIN numbers (Gutmann,A. Volkamer,M. Renaud,K. 2016).  This research looks at the process of 
conducting an attack utilising a brute force method to find a PIN code for the alarm, but rather than utilising the 
usual sequential attack beginning at 0000 and incrementing the code by one until successful, known codes are 
analysed so that the attack can work through the more likely codes first and try the less likely codes last. 
 There are three different types of codes involved in an alarm system. These are the Master Code, Installer Code 
and the Standard User Code. According to the Alarm Forum (n.d), the Master Code is a code which is most 
commonly used and it acts as both a User code to arm and disarm the alarm and to enable resetting of user codes 
on the alarm system. This code allows full usage however without access right to the alarm system’s control 
panel, which can be performed with Installer Code. This type of code would allow full programming access to 
change user codes if required (Monitoring Plus, 2006). This privilege is given to the Master code so the user 
does not need to call the security company every time modification of user codes is required. The standard 
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NZS2201:2007, the section 5.6.2 explicitly prohibits the reissue of the master code unless there is an extremely 
unavoidable situation to do so. The user code is the most basic code with very limited access rights and which is 
used to arm and disarm the system. This code has less privilege compared to the Master Code and the only 
function of it is to arm and disarm the system.  
 
Figure 1: Standard Alarm System Keypad 
Keypads do not place a restriction on using the same number multiple times. Therefore, there are 10,000 
possible four digit PIN number combinations from 0000-9999. An intruder may be able to attempt multiple 
guesses of the PIN number before the alarm is activated. If a sensor is placed so that anyone gaining physical 
access to the keypad alerts the system by activating the sensor, the intruder may be given a very short time to 
enter a correct PIN number. This is often no more than 30 seconds before the alarm system responds with a siren 
and may also dial a predetermined phone number to alert the recipient of the alarm activation. If a keypad is 
placed where access can be gained without activating a sensor, as is often the case, the intruder may be able to 
try many thousands of PIN numbers without activating the system. The possibility of an intruder trying 
seemingly random numbers and finding a correct code in a short space of time is very unlikely. However, if 
numbers are not chosen randomly but have some meaning to the user or are chosen for reasons that may be 
common such as easy to remember combinations such as 1234, then the chances of success are greatly 
increased.   
In his research into 3.4 million PIN number in a database constructed from a variety of PIN numbers released 
onto the Internet, Berry (2012) discovered certain numbers are chosen more frequently than others and argued 
that people are not particularly strong at choosing a difficult to guess PIN number. The most common numbers 
that are a variety of different PIN numbers but likely not alarm codes, as Berry was unable to ascertain exactly 
where they had come from, are shown in table 1. By identifying the most popularly used PIN numbers and 
performing a brute force attack to the system using these more common PIN numbers first, an intruder may 
successfully gain entry to the premise in a much shorter time than simply systematically trying every number 
from 0000 to 9999.  
 
Table 1: Four digit PIN codes most commonly in use (Berry 2012) 
Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
PIN 1234 1111 0000 1212 7777 1004 2000 4444 2222 6969 9999 3333 5555 6666 1122 1313 8888 4321 2001 1010 
Freq 10 6.0 1.9 1.2 0.75 0.66 0.61 0.53 0.52 0.51 0.45 0.42 0.39 0.39 0.37 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.28 
The following section describes the process of analysing PIN numbers to identify the most common types of 
numbers and therefore predict what numbers are more likely to be chosen than others. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
The researchers were able to obtain 700 genuine and freely chosen 4 digit alarm codes used in businesses in 
New Zealand and these were used as the dataset for analysis. Experiments by the researcher utilising an alarm 
keypad and stop watch  found on average a person entering a 4 digit PIN number onto a keypad would take 
approximately 5 seconds per PIN number. If using a brute force attack against a 4 digit PIN number trying all 
possible 10,000 combinations, it would take an attacker approximately 50,000 seconds, which is 13.9 hours. If 
the PIN numbers are chosen genuinely at random, then on average the number will be located in half that time. 
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Rasmussen and Rudmin (2010) point out the problem of people’s difficulty with memorising number codes 
causes problems. Although it is a well-known that longer and more complicated PIN codes are more difficult to 
guess or crack, the lack of users’ ability to memorise more complex passcodes means a tendency to choose 
numbers that are easy for them to remember and thus easier to guess or predict. Rasmussen and Rudmin (2012) 
attempted to investigate people’s common strategies and difficulties when memorising a PIN number including 
making a pattern on the keypad rather than remembering a series of numbers.  
With this in mind, the focus becomes how best to predict a number or a method used by a user to choose as the 
code. Whilst some codes are more likely to occur than others, the purpose of this research was to identify what 
types of codes are more likely to be chosen, and therefore groups of ‘likely’ codes could be tried first. The brute 
force attack could therefore begin with the most likely group, move on to the next most likely group and so on 
until the final most unlikely group was the last to be tried. It was hoped that by analysing the 700 PIN codes, 
groups of codes could be established greatly speeding up the success of a brute force attack. The first task was to 
identify the PIN codes that were used multiple times. Initially the study by Berry was used to identify any 
correlation between his study’s findings and the database of alarm codes. A comparison of these codes with the 
alarm code database found that there was some relationship between the Berry findings and the alarm codes but 
some specific codes had almost no relationship. For example, Berry found that the number ‘1234’ was utilised 
over 10% of the time, whereas the alarm database found that it was used for 2 out of the 700 or 0.00314% of the 
time. However, the use of repeating numbers within the code did occur frequently in the database as Berry had 
found. Taking into consideration the study and findings of Berry (2012), his category of numbers was used 
along with two additional categories, those PIN numbers beginning with 19?? and 20?? which may indicate a 
year of significance to a user. Another category considered was a PIN number which is composed with a 
sequential number either ascending or descending order. This category was considered due to its relative 
simplicity for memorising PIN numbers in such characteristics and due to the fact that Berry (2012) has 
identified 1234 as the most popularly used PIN numbers. Due to this, certain PIN numbers may fall into two 
categories: such as PIN number 1999. This will fall into a category of a year, and also into a category of PIN 
number that is composed with two different digits only. The following categories were chosen. 
 Category 1: PIN number is composed of four different digits 
o In this category, the code contains numbers that are all unique. That is, no number is repeated in the code 
but the four numbers will form a certain pattern on the keypad. 
 Category 2: PIN number is composed of three different digits 
o In this category, 2 numbers are unique and one other number is repeated. On the keypad, this allows for a 
code that can fit on a line composed of 3 numbers wide by repeating a number. 
 Category 3: PIN number is composed of two different digits 
o In this category there are only 2 numbers and either both are repeated once or one of those numbers is 
repeated 3 times. 
 Category 4: PIN number is composed of one number only 
o In this category, a single number is used and repeated 4 times. 
 Category 5: PIN number with 19 or 20 
o  In this category, the user has apparently chosen a recent year of significance  
 Category 6: PIN number with sequential numbering: 
o In this category, the user has chosen a PIN number with 4 digits in numerical ordering. This can be 
ascending or descending starting from any digit.  
By utilising these 6 broad categories, the numbers that may fit into those categories can be identified and then 
their frequency in the database found. The first 3 categories focus on patterns that may be identified and 
therefore more easily remembered. It was noted that there may be some numbers chosen by users for some 
significance, but that coincidentally fit into a pattern such as a straight line. Additionally, some numbers will fit 
into more than one category. These are identified and guidelines used to ensure that all numbers appear once in 
the guideline and are not repeated. The next step in the process is to examine each category and construct more 
specific sub-categories based on the codes physical appearance on the keypad. The aim of category 1 and 2 is to 
identify all the possible patterns on a keypad that can be formed.  
 Category 1: PIN number is composed of four different digits 
1) Square (Four corners)   
2) Four digits in the middle of the keypad making a vertical line  
3) Diamond shape  
4) Rectangle shape  
5) L shape in any orientation 
6) Reverse L shape in any orientation 
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7) Y shape  
 
 
Table 2: Category 1 Number Groupings 
Pattern Number PIN Number Combination 
Square (Four Corners) 24 1397, 1379, 1793, 1739, 1937, 1973 
3971, 3791, 3179, 3917, 3719, 3197 
9713, 9137, 9317, 9173, 9371, 9731 
7139, 7913, 7931, 7391, 7193, 7319  
Four digits in middle vertical line  2 2580, 0852 
Diamond shape  24 2684, 2648, 2486, 2468, 2846, 2864 
6842, 6482, 6248, 6824, 6284, 6426 
4268, 4826, 4862, 4683, 4628, 4268  
8426, 8264, 8624, 8346, 8462, 842 
Rectangle shape 24 1346, 1364, 1463, 1436, 1634, 1643 
3461, 3641, 3146, 3614, 3416, 3164 
4613, 4136, 4631, 4361, 4163, 4316 
6134, 6413, 6314, 6143, 6341, 6431 
L shape 16 1478, 2589, 3214, 6547, 9632, 8521, 7896, 4563 
8741, 9852, 4123, 7456, 2369, 1258, 6987, 3654 
Y shape  24 1358, 1385, 1538, 1583, 1853, 1835  
3581, 3851, 3815, 3158, 3185, 3518 
5813, 5138, 5381, 5831, 5318, 5183 
8135, 8513, 8153, 8315, 8531, 8315 
Reverse L shape  16 3698, 2587, 6541, 9874, 8523, 7412, 7896, 4563  
8963, 7852, 1456, 4789, 3258, 2147, 6987, 3654 
 
 Category 2:  PIN number is composed of three different digits 
1) Vertical line 
2) Horizontal line 
3) Diagonal line  
 
Table 3: Category 2 Number Groupings 
Pattern Number PIN Number Combination 
Vertical Line 24 1147, 1447, 1477, 2258, 2558, 2588, 3369, 3669, 3699  
7411, 7441, 7741, 8522, 8552, 8852, 9633, 9663, 9963 
5800, 5880, 5580, 2588, 2558, 2588 
Horizontal Line  18 1123, 1223, 1233, 4456, 4556, 4566, 7789, 7889, 7899 
3211, 3221, 3321, 6544, 6554, 6654, 9877, 9887, 9987 
Diagonal Line  12 7753, 7553, 7533, 9951, 9551, 9511 
3577, 3557, 3357, 1599, 1559, 1159 
 
 Category 3 PIN number is composed of two different digits 
There is no pattern for this category. However this category can be divided into two different sub categories for 
this category which are:  
1) 2 digits are repeated twice (for example, 1212)  
2) One digit is repeated three times (for example, 1112) 
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Table 4: Category 3 Number Groupings 
Pattern Number PIN Number Combination 
2 Digits Repeated twice 50 
Times 9 
 
(450) 
11xx, 1x1x, x11x, x1x1, xx11  
22xx, 2x2x, x22x, x2x2, xx22,  
33xx, 3x3x, x33x, x3x3, xx33, 
44xx, 4x4x, x44x, x4x4, xx44 
55xx, 5x5x, x55x, x5x5, xx55 
66xx, 6x6x, x66x, x6x6, xx66 
77xx, 7x7x, x77x, x7x7, xx77 
88xx, 8x8x, x88x, x8x8, xx88 
99xx, 9x9x, x99x, x9x9, xx99 
00xx, 0x0x, x00x, x0x0, xx00 
2 Digits: 1 Repeated 3 Times  40 
Times 9 
 
(360) 
111x, 11x1, 1x11, x111 
222x, 22x2, 2x22, x222 
333x, 33x3, 3x33, x333 
444x, 44x4, 4x44, x444 
555x, 55x5, 5x55, x555 
666x, 66x6, 6x66, x666 
777x, 77x7, 7x77, x777 
888x, 88x8, 8x88, x888 
999x, 99x9, 9x99, x999 
000x, 00x0, 0x00, x000 
 Category 4: PIN number is composed of one number only 
In this category, there is no pattern as a single digit is repeated 4 times. 
 
Table 5: Category 4 Number Groupings 
Pattern Number PIN Number Combination 
1 Digit Repeated 4 times 10 1111, 2222, 3333, 4444, 5555 
6666, 7777, 8888, 9999, 0000 
 Category 5: PIN number with 19 or 20 
Whilst this does not represent a pattern, it would appear most likely that a date would have already past for 
it to be of some personal significance. Therefore it is expected that codes beginning 19 will be more 
frequent than those beginning with 20. 
 
Table 6: Category 5 Number Groupings 
Pattern Number PIN Number Combination 
Begin 19 100 19xx 
Begin 20 100 20xx 
 
 Category 6: PIN number with sequential numbering 
This pattern is 4 digits in numerical ordering - the most basic of pins & therefore maybe occurring regularly 
as the sequence is easy to remember. 
 
Table 7: Category 6 Number Groupings 
Pattern Number PIN Number Combination 
4 digits in numerical order 7 0123, 1234, 2345, 3456, 4567, 
5678, 6789 
4 digits in numerical order in 7 9876, 8765, 7654, 6543, 5432, 
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reverse 4321, 3210 
 
 Category 7: 25 PIN numbers obtained from home alarm users.  
 
Table 8: Test set of genuine alarm codes  
Pattern Number PIN Number Combination 
Test set of 
genuine 
alarm codes 
30 0123, 0227, 0247, 0404, 0521, 0629, 0904, 1470, 
1234, 1962, 2468, 2514, 2875, 3107, 4201, 4425, 
4663, 4989, 4927, 5242, 5683, 7233, 7479, 7777, 
7942, 8282, 8888, 8989, 9876, 9908 
 
Once the categories of PIN numbers were chosen, the expectations of the analysis were then derived as follows: 
A large number of PIN numbers in the database will at least belong to one of six categories.  
1) The analysis by Berry (2012) and the analysis of the 700 PIN numbers will indicate relative similarity.  
2) A specific category will be noticeably more popular than other categories  
3) It is expected that the percentage of PIN numbers than do not belong to a category will not exceed 
50%, since most categories were identified and users are assumed to choose a PIN number according to 
its simplistic nature or a specific pattern  
4) The specific most popular PIN number is expected to belong to one of the six categories  
5) A brute force attack performed with the most popular PIN numbers and/or the most popular category 
will reduce time taken for a successful brute force attack to at least half.  
RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
The 700 PIN numbers present in the database were examined and analysed according to their distinctive 
characteristics including them into at least one of the categories. If a PIN number did not belong to at least one 
category of the six defined, it was to be defined as no category PIN number. As an assumption was that people 
would choose PIN numbers that were easy to memorise over random numbers, category 4 was the simplest 
category and was expected to occupy at least one-third of the database. Category 1 and 2 dealt with PIN 
numbers with a certain pattern, and since the initial assumption was that a significant percentage of users would 
draw certain pattern on a keypad to aid themselves with memorising as discussed by Rasmussen and Rudmin 
(2012), percentages of expected numbers of the 700 code dataset could be calculated and then measured against 
what was actually present. The results are shown in Table 9.  
Table 9: Pin Numbers by Primary Category 
Variance Expected Actual over/under expected 
Category 1  10% 1% -9% 
Category 2  10% 0% -10% 
Category 3 15% 8% -7% 
Category 4 30% 1% -29% 
Category 5  5% 4% -1% 
Category 6 15% 1% -14% 
No category 15% 85% +70% 
Total 100% 100%  
It was somewhat unexpected to observe that a large number of PIN numbers in the database did not belong to 
any one of the six categories. 85%, which accounts for 595 PIN numbers did not belong to a category which 
might hint that the alarm users were comfortable to select PIN numbers with no apparent pattern and memorise 
them. This significantly deviated from initial expectation and findings of previously research where ease of 
memorising the number in apparent patterns was a significant influencing factor. The aim of the research was to 
identify users’ behaviour relating to choice of alarm codes and to show that a brute force attack would be 
significantly more efficient by taking into consideration people’s behaviour. The initial results were tending 
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towards showing that the results of the alarm code choice were different than for other types of PIN codes and 
certainly greatly differed from the findings of Berry. 
Expectation had been that category 1 would to compose about 10% of the database, that is, about 70 numbers 
were to be expected in this category. Despite only two possible combinations available, the four digits in the 
middle of the keypad were expected to appear more than other patterns in the category, due to its frequent 
occurrence at the study by Berry (2012). Although there were more available combinations existed, Y shape was 
not expected to appear as much due to more complicated nature of the pattern. For other patterns, at least half of 
the available combinations were expected to appear in the database. 
Table 10: Pin Numbers Analysed In Category 1 
Variance  Expected Actual over/under expected 
 Square 12 1 -11 
Middle four digit  10 1 -9 
Diamond shape 12 0 -12 
Rectangle shape 12 0 -12 
L shape 8 2 -6 
Y shape 8 1 -7 
Reverse L shape  8 3 -5 
Total 70 8  
In general, all of the possible combinations in this category were heavily underestimated. The most distinctive 
pattern in this category was the shapes that related to ‘L’ shape, whether it is reverse or straight L shape. Against 
expectations, the middle four digits vertically down the keypad was not a common choice and appeared only 
once in the database. In category 2 it was expected that approximately 10% of PIN numbers or 70 PIN numbers 
would be present. However, none of the 700 PIN numbers in the database belonged to this category.  In category 
3 the initial expectation was that this category was to appear about 15%, which is about 105 PIN numbers. It 
was found that only 56 or fewer than half expected belonged to this category. In category 4 210 numbers were 
expected yet only 6 existed and in category 5, despite the simplicity involved in the numbers in the category, the 
result was heavily under expected. The result analysed in this category significantly differed from the analysis 
by Berry (2012), where all the PIN number combinations in this category were apparent in his top ten most 
popular 4-digit PIN numbers. A noticeable behaviour is that the PIN numbers 1111 and 6666 are not present in 
the database. These PIN numbers may avoided for most people due to concern of the PIN number 1111 or 1234 
or superstition relating to 666. It is also interesting to note that PIN 0000 was not present which may indicate 
that the commercial nature of the dataset had led to a requirement to change the default codes, something that 
may not occur always on home alarm systems. The results are shown in figure 2. 
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 Figure 2: Most commonly chosen PIN numbers 
It was decided to use these 12 categories as the test categories. Added to this at the head of the list is a 13 th 
category, one number repeated twice. Whilst this does not form a pattern, it was found to be the most common 
approach to choosing a number. Finally, the 30 test PIN numbers were analysed utilising the standard sequential 
brute force attack and this was compared with the modified brute force attack. These 30 test PINs were obtained 
by asking people known to the researcher, and who had home alarm systems, what numbers they had used in the 
past or currently used. The purpose is to test the modified attack on a distinct dataset to show that it is more 
efficient than the standard attack. The process is to work through the categories of PIN numbers from most 
likely to least likely and once all numbers in the categories have been exhausted, revert to a sequential brute 
force attack on the remaining numbers. Table 11 shows the number of codes in each of the 13 categories. 
 
Table 11: The 13 categories for the modified attack  
Category 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Number  320 10 45 36 7 7 100 100 2 8 8 112 20 
 
The problem of including shapes formed but out of sequence highlights the necessity to look carefully through 
the chosen codes and plot them on the keypad. Selecting these numbers allows for easier memorisation but 
makes it more difficult for the attacker unless they are aware of this type of behaviour.  
Table 12: Standard v Modified brute force attack 
Category Code 
1 0227 0904 4425 4663 4989 5242 7233 7479 9908 
3 0404 8282 8989 
5 0123 1234  
6 9876 
7 1962 
11 2875  
12 2514 
NIL 0247 0521 0629 1470 2468 3107 4201 4927 5683 7777 7942 8888 
 
The total number of PIN codes that could possibly fall into one of these 13 categories is 767 out of 10 000 codes 
which equates to 7.67% of the codes. With 30 codes in the test dataset, it would therefore be expected that 2.3 
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codes would be expected to be into one of these categories if chosen randomly. Results show that 18 of the 30 
codes or 60% fell into these categories. This shows the effectiveness of the new attack with a well over 50% 
chance that the code will be found in the first 767 codes attempted rather than 5000 attempts with the standard 
brute force attack. However, it is not always the case that a code will be found more quickly with the modified 
attack. Rather, on average the code will be found more quickly with the new attack. Overall the modified attack 
is likely to lead to the code being found in much fewer attempts than the standard attack and therefore in a 
quicker time on average of approximately 767 attempts multiplied by 5 seconds per attempt equates to  3835 
seconds or just over one hour as opposed to almost 7 hours with the standard attack. This research shows that 
the choosing PIN codes for alarms should be a robust process rather than allowing users to choose their own 
codes where personal influences may lead to simplified attacks. These attacks can be mitigated by choosing 
random numbers and by ensuring codes longer than 4 numbers are chosen. The preference should be for 6 
numbers selected randomly to increase the time of this attack from just over one hour to 690 hours, or over 4 
days with a manual attack and to place a sensor in sight of all keypads so that an attacker cannot enjoy the 
luxury of time when mounting this attack, even when automated with the use of a computer. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this study was to determine whether alarm code PIN numbers were predictable by pattern of 
frequency of chosen numbers. The study by Berry in 2012 of 3.4 million different PIN codes released on the 
Internet was used as a basis for comparing the 700 genuine alarm codes obtained from a single source. Analysis 
found that alarm code PIN number choice varies from PIN numbers utilised in other systems requiring a 4 digit 
PIN number. However, some unique features were determined which would allow a brute force attack against 
an alarm code to be simplified by trying more likely types of PIN numbers first and leaving the least likely PIN 
number to last. While the results did not closely follow the Berry findings, this study has highlighted the 
necessity for users to choose PIN number that are not easily predicted and utilise methods to memorise PIN 
numbers that cannot be predicted by an attacker. Further research is planned where a physical implementation of 
the attack will be performed utilising a laptop computer, an alarm system and a file of 10 000 Pin codes listed 
from most to least likely. These will be read one at a time and tried against the alarm system so that the 
improvement in speed in locating a number can be demonstrated. This research forms the basis of a guideline on 
how users should select PIN numbers that are more secure than the numbers that are currently being chosen. 
REFERENCES 
Alarm Forum. (n.d). How do I determine how many zones are needed on my security alarm? Retrieved from 
http://www.diyalarmforum.com/diy-alarm-faq18/ 
Bellis, M. (n.d). History of locks. Retrieved from http://inventors.about.com/library/inventors/bllock.htm 
Berry, N. (2012).  PIN Analysis. Retrieved from http://www.datagenetics.com/blog/september32012/ 
Berry, S. (2010). One in five use birthday as PIN number. Retrieved from 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/borrowing/creditcards/8089674/One-in-five-use-
birthday-as-PIN-number.html 
Gutmann,A. Volkamer,M. Renaud,K. (2016) “Memorable and Secure: How Do You Choose Your PIN?” 
Proceedongs of the Tenth International Symposium on Human Aspects of Information Security & 
Assurance (HAISA 2016). 
Krebs on Security, (2013). Does your Alarm have a Default Duress Code? Retrieved from 
http://krebsonsecurity.com/2013/01/does-your-alarm-have-a-default-duress-code/ 
Monitoring Plus. (2006). Get the most from your burglar alarm. Retrieved from 
https://www.monitoringplus.co.nz/ 
Rasmussen, M. and Rudmin, F. (2010). The coming PIN code epidemic: A survey study of memory of numeric 
security codes. Electronic Journal of Applied Psychology. 6(2):5-9. Retrieved 19 March, 2012, from 
http://ojs.lib.swin.edu.au/index.php/ejap/article/viewPDFInterstitial/182/220 
Standards New Zealand (2007). Standard NZS2201.1:2007. Retrieved 8th November 2016 from 
https://shop.standards.govt.nz/catalog/2201.1%3A2007%28AS%7CNZS%29/view  
29
USING GRAPHIC METHODS TO CHALLENGE CRYPTOGRAPHIC 
PERFORMANCE 
 
Brian Cusack, Erin Chapman 
Digital Forensic Research Laboratories, AUT 
brian.cusack@aut.ac.nz, erinchapman@xtra.co.nz 
 
Abstract 
Block and stream ciphers have formed the traditional basis for the standardisation of commercial ciphers in the 
DES, AES, RC4, and so on. More recently alternative graphic methods such as Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) 
have been adopted for performance gains. In this research we reviewed a range of graphic and non-graphic 
methods and then designed our own cipher system based on several graphic methods, including Visual 
Cryptography (VC). We then tested our cipher against RC4 and the AES algorithms for performance and security. 
The results showed that a graphics based construct may deliver comparable or improved security and performance 
in many of the required areas. These findings offer potential alternative avenues for post-quantum cryptographic 
research. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The demand for cryptographic methods has always been strong. The ever-expanding use of technology for 
communications, banking and financial transactions of diverse types, secure communications, and many other 
Internet applications is driving current demand for security and performance. The consumers of cryptography 
products require ever-increasing protection at lower cost (Thakur et al., 2011). Algorithms must maintain the 
confidentiality of communications, the integrity of the messages, and the accessibility of information to the users. 
The requirement for privacy of information has become increasingly challenging, caught in inter-jurisdictional 
debates of legality and the ability of developers to provide the levels of protection required (Bhat et al., 2015). The 
implementation of cryptographic algorithms in modern networked systems is crucial to ensure the users of 
information are satisfied with the service they receive. Many standardised algorithms have come and gone as 
vulnerabilities have been exploited to make algorithms unusable in the current cryptographic climate.  
Events such as the theoretical cracking of the data encryption standard (DES), revisions including triple DES, and 
the major competition that resulted in the adoption of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) (Fluhrer et al., 
2011; Singhal & Raina, 2011), illustrate the constant evolution of cryptography. While much research has been 
done to improve the security of traditional ciphers such as the AES and the now-defunct Rivest Cipher 4 (RC4) 
(Klien, 2008), there are opportunities for the development and improvement of alternative ciphers (Ustimenko, 
2007). Our research focused on the potential of graphic methods. Encryption using Visual Cryptography (VC) and 
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), is well-established and has been shown to give high levels of security, 
improved performance, and reduced resource requirements. It also shows that that alternative competitors can be 
found in graphic schemes. To demonstrate that there are alternative approaches to achieve secure methods for the 
ever-expanding online world we constructed a word-oriented symmetric stream cipher. It was tested against AES, 
RC4, ECC, and VC algorithms, and the results demonstrated that alternatives are possible using graphic schemes.  
The proposed system was termed Coordinate Matrix Encryption (CME) to reflect the graphic construct behind the 
algorithm (Galbraith & Menezes, 2005; Hou et al., 2014). It was implemented in Java along with the four competing 
algorithms, and we tested both graphic-based and traditional cryptographic algorithms against our construct. The 
algorithms were all tested for security, efficiency and resource consumption. The comparative results show the high 
levels of security achievable by alternative graphic-based ciphers and the potential for alternative innovations. The 
resistance of the proposed 8-bit CME system to brute force attacks was shown to be 157,899 orders of magnitude 
higher than that of a 128-bit key in traditional ciphers such as AES. Examination of the avalanche effect of the CME 
scheme showed that less than 0.5% of all bytes within the cipher text remained in the same position when a single 
bit of the plaintext was altered. While the RC4 scheme offered the best efficiency in terms of time required to 
encrypt and decrypt the data, it has been proven vulnerable; and the CME comparison showed lower memory 
requirements and faster setup execution. This offers the potential for research, testing and implementation of 
different approaches to make traditional cryptography adaptable to the new high-speed cyber connected world 
(Vigila et al., 2009; Tawalbeh et al., 2013). 
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GRAPHIC METHODS 
Graphic-based systems rely on group theory and graph theory to create secure algorithms for encryption. Some of 
the more popular graphic-based methods are ECC (Akhter, 2015) and VC (Blundo et al., 2006). However, there are 
other algorithms that take advantage of the innate properties of group theory and families of graphs (Cohn, 2000; 
Polak et al., 2013). These graphic methods for encryption exploit particular traits of certain types of graphs, such as 
those using families of graphs of large girth, for example Cayley graphs. A Cayley graph is defined as a graph 
G(G,S) where S is a non-empty subgroup of the group G, such that S is equal to its own inverse , and the 
set of vertices is equal to G, V=G, and the set of edge elements is:  
 
A Cayley graph constructed in this manner is a regular graph, and the underlying algebraic structures of the family 
of Cayley graphs can be exploited for use in encryption (Priyadarsini, 2015).   
Another family of graphs providing a possible route for cryptographic research is the family of directed graphs of 
large girth. The fact that there are only three families of undirected graphs of arbitrarily large girth limits their use, 
however there are infinite numbers of algebraically constructed families of such graphs. These can be converted to 
equivalent Turing machines of basic construction. The basic finite automaton is equitable to a directed graph, if the 
memory component is ignored. These graphs are part of the expander family of graphs. Cayley graphs can be used 
to describe a linear automata, while other graph families can be used to result in non-linear systems for encryption. 
Encryption systems based around groups of graphs such as Cayley or expander families use sequences of vertices or 
graph-colourings to create a cipher text. Others opt for using strongly regular graphs to generate a Hadamard matrix 
for encoding images (Davidoff et al., 2003). Some systems use the vertices to represent the plaintext space and the 
path within the graph becomes the password. Systems such as these based around walks along graph edges can be 
used in the construction of stream ciphers. Expander graphs are also of interest in cryptography; they are sparse, 
finite, and highly connected. Ramanujan graphs are a brand of expander graphs that are often used for encryption 
(Agnarsson & Greenlaw, 2007).    
 
Figure 1. A simple Cayley graph described by G=Z/6Z,S={1,-1} 
New systems have been proposed that utilise group theory and rings to create encryption that relies on the 
combining of two group elements. The reversing of these processes is impossible and hence establishes their 
cryptographic value. Multivariate cryptography is the set of cryptosystems which use polynomials and finite 
commutative rings for encryption, and these are part of the post-quantum cryptography movement (Ustimenko & 
Romanczuk, 2013). The concepts of quantum cryptography have been used and applied to theoretically break many 
standard cryptographic algorithms including the RSA. Post-quantum cryptography involves systems that are 
theoretically resistant to adversaries using quantum attacks. Graphic methods have hence been explored as 
possibilities in the post-quantum world, with the potential to define non-standard cryptographic methods that are 
better and stronger than the new adversaries. New developments in graphic methods have used the injection of 
algebraic geometry into the field of multivariate public key cryptosystems with outstanding effect (Blakley & 
Kabatiansky, 2011). The structures are a set of multivariate quadratic polynomial equations over finite fields and 
parameterised matrices for systems of para-unitary equations that deliver the cryptographic solution. Multivariate 
polynomials are a solution to the problems of RSA and an alternative to systems like ECC, using multivariate 
systems of equations over small fields, such as  where m is some small number. The use of multivariate 
polynomials is a proposed solution to the issues with key size and set up time, both of which are high in 
computational complexity and require large amounts of data to communicate. Multivariate systems generally use 
quadratic polynomial fields. The multivariate systems rely on their own version of the one-way problem, in this case 
called the MQ problem, based on the computational complexity of solving many different quadratic equations over 
multiple different fields using many different variables (Chen et al., 2012; Sutter et al., 2013). The complexity of the 
MQ problem has led to these graphic methods being proposed as a possible quantum-resistant encryption method.  
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ISSUES WITH GRAPHIC METHODS 
Encryption systems that use graphs for encoding, like those based around VC, can have very high computational 
overhead, due to the size of the graphs required to achieve the required levels of security (Klein & Wessler, 2007). 
Also, those encryption methods that base themselves around the special colourings of vertices and edges are 
vulnerable to cubical linearization attacks, which make decryption possible, and are costly in practice. For those 
graph-based systems that also rely on the DLP, the same vulnerabilities encountered by ECC encryption apply. The 
biggest problem within graph based systems is implementation challenges. Representing a graph within a computer 
program can be broken down into four possible objects for management: the adjacency list; the adjacency matrix; 
the incidence list; and the incidence matrix. Each object lists either vertices or edges, and they are either enumerated 
fully – in a matrix – or only where a connection occurs. These implementations affect the use of a particular system, 
especially with larger connected graphs, with many entries in its matrix or list (Riaz & Ali, 2011).  
The security of ECC relies on computational complexity to assure that it is intractable to compute the Elliptic Curve 
Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) (Yan, 2008). This reliance means that the security would be severely 
compromised should the ever-increasing speed of technology provide a method of computing the solution to the 
ECDLP in less than the current exponential time. On the realization of quantum computers, the Elliptic Curve 
Discrete Logarithm problem will no longer be computationally infeasible to compute and exposing the algorithm to 
an intractable vulnerability (Kramer, 2015). The weakness surrounding ECC in a post-quantum world is based on 
Shor’s algorithm, operating on a quantum computer, which is capable of solving problems such as discrete 
logarithms in minimal time. Aside from the possibility of breaking the Discrete Logarithm Problem, ECC also has 
disadvantages in its implementation. It is highly complex to implement, and the resulting cipher text message is 
increased in length from the original plaintext significantly (Akhier, 2015).  
Advances in fields such as index calculus and number-field sieves have shown possible weaknesses in systems 
based around the problem of computing discrete logarithms (Joux & Vitse, 2012). Index calculus, as a method of 
computing discrete logarithms using probability and field arithmetic, which has been used by mathematicians to 
exploit characteristics of groups and to then solve the original discrete logarithm problem (Agnarsson & Greenlaw, 
2007). While classic index calculus has not been implemented successfully against general ECC systems, and 
exponential time square root attacks are more efficient against these general ECC algorithms, the reduction in 
computing time for solving the discrete logarithm problem in other systems may suggest weakness in the overall 
computational complexity of DLP-based systems.  
VC schemes encounter difficulties due to pixel expansion, the number of subpixels required to encode the correct 
level of contrast in each share (Shyu et al., 2007). This expansion greatly affects the required overhead of VC 
schemes, and as such is the target of much research. While there have been schemes proposed that give a constant 
pixel expansion, such as graph-based extended VC (Lu et al., 2011), many schemes require linear, or even 
polynomial pixel expansion based on the number of nodes within the scheme, making them infeasible for larger 
implementations. Within the schemes which ensure pixel expansion remains constant, the overhead for the encoding 
of the shares is still computationally high for large images with a greater numbers of pixels. These systems which 
constrain pixel expansion also degrade the contrast of an image, as there are fewer subpixels differentiating dark and 
light in the image, making it more difficult for the human eye to visually decode. Once multiple colours are 
introduced to the scheme, pixel expansion becomes even more complex, and overall image contrast is lowered 
further (Liu et al., 2008). A colour VC scheme will also require higher overall time complexity, as each colour 
within the image must have a different threshold for contrast.  
VC is also open to malicious man-in-the-middle attacks, during the transfer of shares to participants. If the shares 
are intercepted, the malicious intermediary could keep the original share, and forward a new, false share to the 
intended participant. The interception of the share would as such result in the security of the scheme being 
completely undermined. Attacking a VC scheme in this manner is generally referred to as cheating. While this risk 
can be decreased by the implementation of a filter where each participant is assigned a specific target image, 
cheating is still possible, by a malicious participant. Cheating prevention VC schemes have been proposed that use 
specific basis matrices in the generation of both the secret shares, and a set of verification shares, to counter the 
ability to generate fake shares. These matrices add an extra column to the original matrices and hence extra cost. 
The problem still remains however, that these basis matrix schemes are not immune to cheating. To prevent this 
type of cheating, it is necessary to introduce multiple extra zero columns into the basis matrices that adds further 
costs. As a result, cheating prevention VC schemes result in higher overheads and increased pixel expansion when 
compared regular VC algorithms, which delivers a lower level of utility in real-world application. The proposal of 
adding tags to individual shares to allow for the identification of false or forged shares may offer additional 
protection against cheating, however it is still vulnerable to attack if an attacker is in possession of a genuine share, 
and can therefore find and replicate the security tag (Wang & Hsu, 2011). 
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ALGORITHM DESIGN 
The algorithm design for the CME scheme was based around a square coordinate matrix and transformations in a 
finite Galois field  (Martin, 2012; Martinez & Encinas, 2013). The coordinate matrix design was structured by 
the concepts delivered in error-correcting codes, in which sparse matrices and code words are used to eliminate 
noise from the transmissions. In addition, security principles from VC were applied. The main encryption process 
uses a randomized coin toss style procedure, which is similar to the VC method of choosing whether a given pixel is 
black or white. This coin toss decides if the next section of the cipher text is to be a blank padding section, or if it is 
the next section of the plaintext message. If it is a blank padding section, one of the locations containing an empty 
entry is picked at random from a blank list, and the binary or integer coordinates (depending on the implementation) 
of that location are then input as the next part of the cipher text. Else, if the section is a part of the plaintext 
message, then a location containing that bit string is randomly chosen from the list of locations for the string. The 
location is then translated into the corresponding coordinates and concatenated to the cipher text. The scheme 
involves the addition of exactly the same number of blank coordinates as enciphered message coordinates. As a 
result of the addition of padding characters, the resulting cipher text is exactly four times the length of the plaintext, 
with two coordinates for every message or padding character, and exactly the same number of padding and message 
characters. The style of encryption means that the total length of the outputted cipher text is fixed at exactly four 
times the length of the plaintext, which may prove to result in undesirable overheads for transmission.  
 
 
Figure 2: A randomly generated key matrix for a 3-bit coordinate CME matrix scheme. 
The use of multiple locations for each bit string and the addition of an equal number of padding coordinates at 
random locations in the ciphertext provide resistance to cryptanalysis, and particularly to known and chosen 
plaintext attacks, as the encryption process therefore results in a non-singular mapping. This non-singular mapping 
means each plaintext input has many possible ciphertext outputs for any one key matrix. The multiple locations also 
result in far more of the overall matrix being taken up by bit strings than would be the case if each string appeared 
only once. Again, this helps prevent cryptanalytic attacks, as it increases the likely occurrence of the same of 
padding coordinates appearing more than once, which is helpful in further confusing any analysis of the resulting 
data. A sample of a 16-bit plaintext and the corresponding 64-bit ciphertext resulting from encryption using a 4-bit 
coordinate matrix scheme is shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Example plaintext ciphertext pair output from a 4-bit CME scheme. 
The decryption process uses the same key matrix as in the encryption process and looks up each of the coordinates. 
If a given coordinate is an empty padding variable, it is discarded. If not, the value of the coordinate is combined 
with the next character of the key string using exclusive-OR, and the resulting value is added to the plaintext output. 
In this manner, the extra noise generated by the encryption process to ensure security is efficiently removed during 
decryption. Because each step of the decryption process consists only of simple entry check and exclusive-OR 
operation, the overall efficiency for decrypting the ciphertext is theoretically higher than that of the encryption 
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process. 
TESTING AND RESULTS 
The algorithm implementations were tested using Java, on an Intel i7 3.1GHz machine with 16GB of RAM. All 
algorithms were tested for resistance to brute force, avalanche effect, set up requirements and encryption/decryption 
time. Equation 1 shows the brute force analysis based on the key space for traditional 128-bit keys, while Equation 
2 compares the resistance of the CME 8 and 4 bit schemes, based on the key space of the relevant matrix sizes. The 
results of avalanche effect testing showed that when the 8-bit CME algorithm was trialled against RC4 and AES it 
not only performed very well but outperformed the traditional algorithms, demonstrating the resilience of the CME 
algorithm, shown in Table 1. Table 2 shows the results of avalanche testing of 4-bit CME against VC, in which both 
algorithms achieved the maximum Hamming distance. Table 3 shows the set up time and memory requirements for 
ECC, 8-bit CME, AES, RC4, and Table 4 shows the set up time and memory for VC and 4-bit CME. 
Encryption/decryption times are given in Table 6 for AES, RC4, and 8-bit CME, and in Table 6 for 4-bit CME and 
VC. These results appear to show CME as a potential competitor for streaming encryption. 
Equation 1    
Equation 2    
 
Table 1: Comparative avalanche effect results with AES and RC4 
Data Size 
(bits) 
Same Bytes (%) Same Position (%) 
RC4 AES CME RC4 AES CME 
304 97.668 37.767 44.839 97.368 24.779 0.414 
928 99.472 62.777 84.026 99.145 38.905 0.388 
3024 99.940 87.935 99.713 99.735 45.857 0.422 
4408 99.979 94.276 99.984 99.819 48.227 0.404 
8144 99.997 99.100 100 99.902 48.593 0.395 
 
Table 2: Comparative avalanche effect results with 4-bit CME and VC 
Data Size (bits) % of Bits Unchanged 
VC CME 4-bit 
16 49.275 50.319 
32 50.169 50.619 
64 50.005 50.499 
128 49.934 50.286 
256 49.981 50.337 
512 50.072 50.120 
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Table 3: Set up and memory requirements for 8-bit CME, AES, ECC and RC4 
 ECC CME AES RC4 
Time taken (ms): 359.5 80.13 409 258.5 
Memory used (MB): 1.192 1.217 2.364 2.340 
 
Table 4: Set up and memory requirements for 4-bit CME and VC 
 4-bit CME VC 
Memory used (MB): 0.448 0.456 
Time taken (ms): 21.44 0 
 
Table 5: Encryption/decryption time for AES, RC4 and 8-bit CME 
Data Size 
(bits) 
Encryption (ms) Decryption (ms) 
AES Byte CME RC4 AES Byte CME RC4 
304 0.199 0.031 0.014 0.17 0.012 0.022 
928 0.142 0.059 0.027 0.182 0.023 0.025 
3024 0.173 0.136 0.023 0.179 0.065 0.016 
4408 0.185 0.173 0.02 0.196 0.05 0.045 
8144 0.148 0.262 0.024 0.25 0.093 0.032 
 
Table 6: Encryption/decryption times for 4-bit CME and VC schemes 
Bit String 
Length 
Encryption (ms) Decryption (ms) 
VC 4-bit CME VC 4-bit CME 
16 0.056 0.02 0.01 0.02 
32 0.08 0.066 0.014 0.036 
64 0.196 0.104 0.052 0.06 
128 0.368 0.214 0.088 0.074 
256 0.868 0.369 0.214 0.136 
512 2.822 1.13 0.492 0.328 
 
CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
Further research into alternative graphic methods is required to explore the applications of alternative systems such 
as CME. The security offered by the proposed CME scheme makes it a potential candidate for post-quantum 
cryptographic research. The system’s alternative key structure and non-singular mapping allow for resistance to a 
large key space and superb avalanche effect, while maintaining competitive efficiency. These features require 
further exploration. Comparative analysis between traditional and graphic-based ciphers is required to determine 
whether alternative graphic methods are able to offer higher security for lower overheads. Optimization of these 
schemes requires further research to ensure a lasting competitive advantage, and suitability for implementation in 
application development. There is currently little standardisation in stream ciphers to replace RC4, and as such the 
opportunity exists for an optimized version of CME to assist in this particular space in applications such as TLS that 
utilize stream ciphers for encryption on a day-to-day basis. 
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Abstract 
Behaviour-based authorisation is a technique that assesses the user of a device for authenticity by comparing 
their activities to previously established behaviour profiles. Passwords and other point of entry authorisation 
techniques are often inadequate for protecting mobile device security as they only provide an initial barrier to 
usage and do not operate continuously. Behaviour-based authorisation continuously assesses user authorisation, 
using the device owner’s profile for authentication. This research improves upon behaviour-based authorisation 
performance by applying a hybridised intrusion detection method. The constituent intrusion detection methods 
that were applied include context-awareness and self-correction. Performance of a behaviour-based 
authorisation method can be measured as either an increase in intrusion detection, without significantly 
increasing false positives or a decrease in false positives without totally compromising intrusion detection. This 
research found that an increase in performance can be achieved by the addition of intrusion detection 
components. 
Keywords 
Behaviour-based authorisation, intrusion detection, context-awareness, self-correction, hybrid intrusion 
detection, artificial neural network, mobile security 
INTRODUCTION 
Mobile devices facilitate a range of multimedia applications, many of which are driven by user data. This user 
data has become sensitive in nature, including personal information, login credentials, and business data (Li, 
Clarke, Papadaki, & Dowland, 2013). Mobile device theft rates have been recorded: 
 Approximately 1.6% of mobile phone owners experienced mobile phone theft in England and Wales 
during 2012/2013 (Home-Office, 2014). 
 Collected US law enforcement data combined with FBI crime data indicates an estimate of 1/10th of all 
theft for 2013 in the US is associated with the theft of a mobile device. According to a consumer 
report’s survey, 3.1 million smartphone thefts occurred in 2013 (Federal-Communications-Commission, 
2014; Tapellini, 2014). 
Credent (cited by Li et al., 2013) found that 40% of participants in a survey failed to utilise personal 
identification numbers (PIN). PIN-based approaches are also often misused when they are weak, rarely changed, 
or shared with others. A fundamental weakness is that it does not seek to validate a user once they know the PIN 
(Li et al., 2013).  
Behaviour-based authorisation is a technique that assesses the user of a device for authenticity by comparing 
their activities to previously established behaviour profiles. A benefit of behaviour-based authorisation is active 
authentication wherein if an intruder somehow bypassed standard point of entry techniques, such as PINs or 
passwords, they will still be under scrutiny (Li et al., 2013). 
The research goal was to ascertain whether or not a combined intrusion detection method can be applied to 
behaviour-based authorisation on mobile devices, with the purpose of performance improvement. The 
performance improvement was measured by an increase in intrusion detection accuracy without significantly 
increasing false positives or a reduction of false positives without totally compromising the intrusion detection 
rate. Intrusion detection methods that were experimented with include contextual-awareness, adapting a system’s 
assessment metrics based on the apparent situation, and self-correction, altering assessment results through 
internal determination based on known information without additional external assistance.  
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RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
Approaches to Behavioural Profiling and Authorisation 
Multiple approaches to behaviour profiling, including such approaches for the purpose of authorisation, have 
been made. These approaches include different types of artificial neural networks, rule-based methods, specially 
designed frameworks, and clustering methods. 
Artificial Neural Networks 
Artificial neural networks (ANNs) are dynamic systems of interconnected parts. They are made up of artificial 
neurons which each take in a set of inputs. Inputs are regulated by weight values and activation functions. A 
training algorithm is applied to an ANN and the weights for all inputs are adjusted to improve the accuracy of 
the output. ANNs are able to detect non-linear relationships and interactions among variables (Anandarajan, 
2002; Wasserman, 1989b). 
Li et al. (2013) experimented a radial basis function (RBF) ANN. The activation functions in an RBF ANN are 
RBFs, which are used to determine the Euclidean distance of the inputs from certain points, known as centres. 
Using this, the mapping relationship between the input and desired output can be obtained (Chang, Cheng, & 
Yu-Feng, 2010; Li et al., 2013).  
Li et al. (2013) also ran experiments with a feed-forward multi-layered perceptron (FF MLP) network. FF MLP 
ANNs pass values in one direction, from input to output, typically using the sigmoid function or hyperbolic 
tangent function as their activation function. The activation functions scale the outputs of each neuron which are 
passed to further neurons in the network (Anandarajan, 2002; Li et al., 2013; Wasserman, 1989b). 
A simple recurrent network (SRN) was experimented with by Anandarajan (2002) for the purpose of classifying 
user behaviour in terms of workplace internet activity. An SRN has a small amount of additional neurons in the 
input layer, known as context units that receive feedback signals from the hidden layers, allowing the ANN to 
record the outputs of the hidden layers. This allows for past values to influence present values going into the 
ANN meaning that the ANN can learn faster than a standard feed-forward ANN (Anandarajan, 2002; Krenker, 
Kos, & Bešter, 2011). 
It was found that ANN based systems, particularly RBF ANNs, would deliver a greater performance in terms of 
correctly profiling user behaviour, at the cost of being more resource intensive, using twice the amount of 
computational power of that of a rule-based method (Li et al., 2013).   
Rule-Based and Fuzzy Systems 
A dynamic rule-based approach was devised by Li et al. (2013) based on the idea that recent historical usage can 
be used to predict the probability of a present event. As shown in Equation 1 the approach would provide a 
mechanism to have all recorded outputs bounded between 0 and 1 to help determine a threshold. If a singular 
output breaches the threshold, then the event is deemed to have breached the rule-set (Li et al., 2013). 
 
Equation 1 Where:  = the features of one chosen application,  = the value of ,  = total number of 
values for   = total number of features, t = predefined  Threshold,   = feature occurrence (Li et 
al., 2013). 
Sood, Mehmi, and Dogra (2015) conducted experimentation with a fuzzy system applying a user profiling 
system for cloud computing. Fuzzy systems work by representing data in degrees rather than as booleans in a 
linguistic way. Fuzzy systems are ideal for solutions where the problem is non-linear or hard to define. Fuzzy 
logic is rule-based and determines what degree values are in relation to their variables. Variables that have had 
their fuzzy values determined are weighted and aggregated to develop a crisp output (Sood et al., 2015). 
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Rule-based methods appear to be able to distinguish user activity from different users through behaviour 
profiling, but at a lesser rate of some machine learning methods as RBF ANNs (Li et al., 2013). 
Other methods of user profiling 
Majeed, Jing, Novakovic, and Ouazzane (2014) applied K-means clustering as a means to establish a user profile 
with which to compare future user behaviour for legitimacy. K-means clustering is used to create a usage profile 
from the input data gathered by a feature extractor. Once the usage profile is created the feature extractor 
compares new user data to determine deviation. If a persistent deviation occurs, an alert is made (Majeed et al., 
2014). 
Shi, Niu, Jakobsson, and Chow (2011) developed a machine learning framework based around modelling 
independent features. The user model is developed as a combination of the probability density of all features, 
based on time of occurrence. Selected features were based on good events, bad events and location. Good events 
would be those conducted with known contacts, bad events are those with unknown contacts. When in training, 
frequency and time between certain events would be used to establish feature probability. Using the Gaussian 
mixture model (GMM) the probability of user being at a certain location at a certain time would also be 
calculated (Shi et al., 2011). 
The research conducted by Shi et al. (2011) provide a set of concise features that behaviour-based authorisation 
can be tested on, including calls made, texts made, internet activity, and user location (Shi et al., 2011). 
Of the methods of behaviour-based profiling and authorisation, ANNs and rule-based methods appear to produce 
effective results, being able to identify most intrusive activity records during various experiments. However, the 
problem of false positives remains among these methods. Work done by Li, Wheeler, and Clarke (2014) based 
on that from Li et al. (2013) found that while illegitimate users were denied application access 95.83% of the 
time, their developed framework allowed legitimate users access only 87.09% of time (Li et al., 2014). 
Intrusion detection methods for reducing false positives 
False positive reduction is important to intrusion detection as false positives make it more difficult to identify 
intrusive activity and can cause resource intensive false alarms that discourage the use of the intrusion detection 
system altogether. 
Cluster-based Intrusion Detection Methods 
Yassin, Udzir, Muda, and Sulaiman (2013) used K-means clustering and Naïve Bayes classification methods 
combined to minimise false alarms generated by anomaly-based intrusions detection systems. K-means 
clustering is used to separate activity data, normal or intrusive, into separately identifiable partitions. Naïve 
Bayes Classification uses a set of attributes assigned to a set of classes and calculates the probability of activity 
belonging to one class (normal activity) to another (intrusive activity) by assessing the occurrence of attributes 
with the given activity. The combination of K-means clustering and Naïve Bayes classification performed 
greater, in terms of reducing false positives, than either of the two methods standalone, demonstrating the 
advantages of hybrid approaches (Yassin et al., 2013). 
Hybrid frequency and relation-based Intrusion Detection Methods  
Spathoulas and Katsikas (2010) discuss and experiment with a system with three components: 
 Neighbouring Related Alerts (NRA) 
 High Alert Frequency (HAF) 
 Usual False positives (UFP) 
The NRA method relies on the assumption that most attacks have a group of alerts related to it. NRA works by 
counting the amount of neighbours that exist in a time window, that have the same source and destination 
addresses (Spathoulas & Katsikas, 2010).  
HAF is based on how often an alert with a certain signature appears within a certain time window. Each existing 
signature is given an average frequency which establishes the general distribution of signatures. After that, every 
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time a signature occurs, the minimum amount of time for reoccurrence is established. If reoccurrence of a 
signature appears before it should several times it will cause an alert (Spathoulas & Katsikas, 2010).  
UFP is designed based on the idea that patterns of common false positives are related to topology problems or 
misconfigured services. The frequency for the signature during an attack-free period is made. During actual 
deployment, if a number of common frequencies occur more than expected, it may be a true positive and an alert 
is made if an established limit is breached. 
Each component acts independently to one another before combining their individual verdicts on whether or not 
a given alert is true. This allows for the strengths and weaknesses of each component to complement and 
mitigate each other (Spathoulas & Katsikas, 2010). 
System security status level 
Part of the research conducted by Li et al. (2013) involved the development of a framework that could facilitate 
behaviour-based authorisation. The framework was developed to take into account different error rates 
experienced by different sets of application usage data. A System security status (SSS) level is kept between -3 
and +3 where -3 is low security and +3 is high security. SSS level is determined by the performance of a given 
application based on equal error rate (EER) and the verification result, which can be a pass or fail. A verification 
test is when user behaviour is matched to what is expected. If the verification is successful, it is added to the SSS 
level. If verification fails, it is subtracted. The SSS also decreases over time through lack of usage. The SSS 
framework allows for a given base behaviour-based authorisation method to produce initially incorrect results 
but for corrections to be made if necessary based on further results (Li et al., 2013). 
CHOSEN BEHAVIOUR-BASED AUTHORISATION METHOD 
Artificial Neural Network 
The behaviour-based authorisation method chosen as a baseline for this research was an ANN. The ANN was 
built using pybrain, a python module that allows customisable ANNs to be built and applied to datasets. The 
ANN was built with a configuration of four inputs, one output neuron and a variable amount of hidden neurons. 
The input values were the day of the week for a given activity record, the time of the day for a given activity 
record, the type of activity recorded and the details of the activity record. The output of the ANN would be a 
single number, where the closer to one the value was, the more likely the record would be that of a legitimate 
user. 
...
Day of Record
Time of Record
Type of Record
Record Details
Output Value
Input Layer with 
4 Inputs
Hidden Layer with n 
Hidden Neurons
Output Layer with 
1 Output Neuron
h1
h2
h3
h4
hn
 
Figure 1 ANN configuration for Behaviour-Based Authorisation Diagram, the number of hidden neurons (n) is a 
configurable amount that had been experimented on.  
The ANN configuration in Figure 1 receives four input values in the input layer and produces one output. The 
output value is a number that is tested by examining whether or not it comes between an established pair of 
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threshold values. If the output value falls outside the threshold values, it is designated as an intrusion, if it falls 
between the threshold values it is designated as legitimate activity. The ANN was trained using the supervised 
method of backwards propagation, as provided by the pybrain module (Wasserman, 1989a). Only legitimate user 
behaviour could be used to train the ANN as intrusive behaviour would be unknown. 
Chosen Behavioural Attributes 
Partly based on the research conducted by Shi et al. (2011), for this experiment the following mobile device 
attributes were used as independent/control variables to measure accuracy of the improved behaviour based 
authorisation method: 
 calls made to known contacts 
 calls made to unknown contacts 
 text messages sent to known contacts 
 texts messages sent to unknown contacts 
 packet data sent to and from the device 
 location of the mobile device 
 day of the week and time of day activity occurs 
INTRUSION DETECTION COMPONENTS 
Self-correction using surrounding data 
Self-correction provides a form of improvement that doesn’t require user intervention (Patel et al., 2011). 
Because self-correction must be conducted without external intervention, it must be able to determine a 
correction only using internal factors (Schmeck, Müller-Schloer, Çakar, Mnif, & Richter, 2010; Yang et al., 
2013). Surrounding data describes the records that occur before and after a given timeline record. Using 
surrounding data, a given record can be reassessed and potentially corrected if required. This works by assessing 
the surrounding data of a record. If a certain amount of the surrounding data records are assessed as intrusive, 
then it is concluded that the surrounded record is also intrusive. If a certain amount of the surrounding data 
records are not intrusive, the surrounded record will be determined to be a legitimate record. 
Record n-o
Record n-2
Record n-1
Record n
Record n+o
Record n+2
Record n+1
Record n-2 I
Record n-1 L
Record n    Determined as I
Record n+2 L
Record n+1 I
Record n-2 L
Record n-1 L
Record n   Determined as L
Record n+2 L
Record n+1 I
...
...
o = Outreach, where outreach is the 
amount of surrounding data records 
assessed on either side of a given 
examined record (record n)
Each record had been 
assessed via ANN as either 
intrusive (I) or legitimate (L)
If the occurrence of I is 
greater than the tolerance (t), 
record n is then determined 
as I
However, if the occurrence of 
I is less than or equal to t, 
record n is determined as L
For example, where o = 2 and t = 1
For example, where o = 2 and t = 1
Two surrounding records had 
been determined as Intrusive 
by the ANN’s initial 
assessment, therefore Record 
n is determined to be 
Intrusive
Only one surrounding record 
had been determined as 
intrusive by the ANN, which 
is equal to the tolerance, 
therefore Record n is 
determined to be legitimate
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Figure 2 Diagram describing self-correction via surrounding data records 
The self-correction process works by examining records that occur before and after a current record, based on a 
configurable outreach, and adjusts an initial assessment of a record, whether it is intrusive or legitimate, by 
examining the initial assessments of the surrounding records. If the numbers of records surrounding the 
examined record, within the given outreach, that is different to the examined record exceed a threshold value, 
which is also configurable, the examined record is changed to match the different records. 
Adjusting self-correction through context awareness 
Different conditions that include erratic user behaviour, overtrained ANNs or less distinguishable intruders 
require different approaches to mitigate (Piotrowski & Napiorkowski, 2013; Tetko, Livingstone, & Luik, 1995). 
A dynamic approach that can apply changes to assessment when required will allow a given problem to be 
mitigated without causing another problem. 
Context awareness was applied to self-correction to allow for the tolerance of potential false assessments to be 
adjusted. If false positives occur frequently, tolerance was increased so that false positives that would otherwise 
remain incorrect can be changed. In the same way that false positives can be accounted for, false negatives that 
would evade the self-correction process can be caught by adjusting the tolerance to be lower. The context-
awareness component adjusts tolerance whenever a false positive or false negative was identified and corrected 
using self-correction.  Whenever a record was not identified as false, the tolerance was changed to be closer to 
the default. 
Record n
Record n to 
change?
Intrusive or 
Legitimate?
Is t greater
 than 1?
Is t less 
than o-1?
Is dt greater than
or less than t?
Increase t Decrease t
Decrease t
Increase t
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Greater Less
I
L
Record n = Record being assessed by self-correction
t = Tolerance values that determines is Record n needs to change
dt = Default tolerance values
o = Outreach of self-correction
When an increase of decrease occurs, if does so by a value of 1
Whether the record is determined as intrusive or legitimate depends on the 
assessment of the self-correction component, which is influenced by t  
Figure 3 Flowchart of the context-aware component working with the self-correction component 
The context-aware component adjusts the threshold of the self-correction component to be either more restrictive 
when false negative has recently been detected and changed or less restrictive when a false positive has recently 
been detected and changed. If no changes had been made due to caught false positives or false negatives, the 
context-aware component either does nothing or changes to be closer to the default self-correction threshold. 
42
Record n ANN assessment
Previous and 
following ANN 
assessment results
Self-correction 
adjustment
Assessment Result
Situational 
tolerance 
adjustment
 
Figure 4 Overview of a record being processed through ANN combined with both intrusion detection 
components.  
The overall process, as described by Figure 4,  examines each record which are assessed by the ANN, previous 
and following assessments are also retrieved. The self-correction component adjusts the assessment of the ANN 
based on the previous and following record assessment, the ANN’s assessment and the threshold adjustment 
made by the context-aware component. The self-correction component sends the result to the context-aware 
component which, based on the situation, will make a tolerance threshold adjustment to the self-correction 
component for the next record. The result from the self-correction component is also the final result for the 
record.  
EXPERIMENT RESULTS 
To test the capabilities of the applied intrusion detection methods of improving behaviour-based authorisation 
performance, three systems were developed. The base ANN (treatment script 1) served as the baseline for 
experimentation and the ANN with a self-correction component and context-awareness (treatment script 3) 
component served as the end-line. The base ANN with only the self-correction component was also assessed 
(treatment script 2). Each system was tested on 14 user pair datasets, where each pair consisted of training data 
from a legitimate user, test data from a legitimate user and test data from an intrusive user. Data for these 14 
datasets was produced from the MIT reality mining dataset (Eagle & Pentland, 2006).The mean overall 
accuracies, false positive rates and true positives rates for each system applied to each dataset were examined.  
The overall accuracy of a behaviour-based authorisation method depends on the rate that it can determine 
intrusive activity, as well as the rate that it produces false positives from legitimate activity. Overall accuracy did 
not always increase, but did for four of the 14 datasets demonstrating its capability to do so.  Examining the 
mean result for all datasets together found that the overall accuracy did increase but not significantly. 
False positives are legitimate activities mistaken for intrusive activities. Overall, the mean false positive rate was 
reduced when the intrusion detection components were applied. With the exception of two datasets, the 
behaviour-based authorisation method with intrusion detection concepts applied was able decrease false 
positives to below 5%. 
True positives are intrusive activities correctly identified as intrusive. Overall the mean true positives rate was 
found to be less when both intrusion detection concepts had been applied. The self-correction component 
significantly increased the true positive rate, but this was always reduced with the application context-awareness. 
It was also found that if the base ANN had a true positive below 10%, the behaviour-based authorisation method 
with both intrusion detection concepts would perform at a rate below 5%, in most cases 0%. 
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Figure 5 Bar chart of different mean overall accuracies separated by Dataset and Treatment Script, with 
datasets 1 through to 14 being plotted across treatment scripts 1, 2 and 3. 
 
Figure 6 Bar chart of different mean false positive rates separated by Dataset and Treatment Script, with 
datasets 1 through to 14 being plotted across treatment scripts 1, 2 and 3. 
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Figure 7 Bar chart of different mean true positive rates separated by Dataset and Treatment Script, with 
datasets 1 through to 14 being plotted across treatment scripts 1, 2 and 3 
CONCLUSION 
This research involved the development of modular components based on intrusion detection methods to find out 
whether or not said intrusion detection methods can improve the performance of behaviour-based authorisation 
on mobile devices. The intrusion detection methods were based around: 
 Self-correction 
 Context awareness 
 Hybridisation 
The results of experimentation found that the performance of a behaviour-based authorisation method for mobile 
devices can be improved by applying a hybrid self-correction and context-aware intrusion detection component, 
but only if the initial base behaviour-based authorisation method can detect intrusions at a rate of at least 10%. 
The self-correction intrusion detection component, when added, improved intrusion detection rates but increased 
the rate of false alarms. The hybrid self-correction and context-aware components, when applied, reduced false 
alarms to an average rate of below 5%, many producing a rate of 0%. However, the hybrid self-correction and 
context-aware components also reduced true positive (intrusion detection) rates for most datasets. Although the 
false positive reduction indicates an increase in performance, if the intrusion detection rate falls to 0, the 
performance of a behaviour-based authorisation method is also effectively 0. The experiments found that if the 
base behaviour-based authorisation method’s intrusion detection rate was at least 10%, the intrusion detection 
rate would not fall to 0 when the hybrid self-correction and context-aware components are applied.  
A reduction in false positives indicates an improvement of performance for a behaviour-based authorisation 
method, as it maintains the accessibility of a device while potentially preventing breaches of privacy and 
integrity. However if the ability to detect intrusions does not exist, the performance of a behaviour-based 
authorisation method also does not exist, regardless of lower false positive rates. As an improvement to the 
performance of the behaviour-based authorisation method only appears to occur when the initial method has an 
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intrusion detection rate of 10% or higher, future research should focus on experimenting with other behaviour-
based authorisation methods that are capable of fulfilling the requirements for improvement. 
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Abstract 
Throughout the past decade the methods employed by terrorist organisations have changed drastically. One of 
these key changes has been associated with the rise of social media such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and 
blogging in general. Terrorist organisations appear to be using the wide reach and vast network capabilities 
created by social media to disseminate propaganda, radicalise susceptible individuals, recruit potential fighters 
and communicate strategic and operational objectives. However, this growing terrorist presence on Social 
Media can also offer invaluable insights into the social networks of terrorist organisations through the use of 
Social Media Mining and Social Network Analysis. By coupling these two techniques together, researchers can 
gain a greater understanding of how to combat and possibly destabilise complex terrorist social networks and 
aid in the fight against radicalisation and terrorism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the past decade the nature of terrorism has changed enormously. Through the changing global 
economy, to the universal issues facing all nations today such as climate change, the face of terrorism is a very 
different, and as many would observe, a more frightening one. While the core of terrorism may be tenacious in 
its changeability, with political, religious and ideological violence still the most common claims to terrorist 
action, arguably the biggest change has come from Social Media. Social Media has opened up new ways for 
radical thinkers to communicate, network, plan and operate. Social media sites such as Facebook, Twitter, 
YouTube, Myspace, and Blogging sites in general, have fundamentally and irrevocably changed the platform for 
terrorist networking in the 21st century. While social media has opened up extraordinary avenues for socialising, 
sharing information, rallying for political and social causes, and identity formation, it has also made combatting 
terrorism exponentially more difficult due to the sheer magnitude of data exchanged and retained . With a 
change in the medium of terrorist networking and organisation, so too must there be a change in the way we 
investigate, understand and counter terrorist networks – and Social Network Analysis (SNA) coupled with Social 
Media itself, may have the answer. This paper will explore how SNA can be used to analyse data collected 
through Social Media Mining to help map out and analyse terrorist networks. This coupling can be immensely 
helpful for future researchers studying terrorist networks, as well as law enforcement and intelligence agencies. 
Social network analysis and terrorism 
Social Network Analysis was developed in the 1950’s as a methodology for investigating relations between 
actors. Where traditional social science methods focused predominantly on the individual as the primary source 
of social data, SNA re-directed the focus on the relations between the actors rather than on the actors themselves 
(Knoke & Yang, 2008). By doing this, SNA practitioners could observe the nuanced dynamics between 
individuals, groups, corporations, nation-states, etc. often providing a rich source of meaningful information not 
obtainable through traditional social science research methods. SNA was then quickly adopted in many different 
disciplines including: criminology, where it was/is used to map criminal organisation structure and analyse the 
power dynamics, distribution and crime patterns of its key players. Anthropology, where tribal, urban and 
informal groups are mapped to aid in understanding the formal and informal social structures. And the health 
sciences, where diseases such as Avian flu and HIV/AIDS can be geographically mapped and better prevented 
through the focus on interactions between infected individuals. With the many benefits of SNA presenting 
themselves in various disciplines, recently, scholars have begun unleashing SNA’s unique analytic capabilities 
on the study of terrorism, and more specifically, terrorist networks (these scholars’ works will be explored later). 
 
48
As Perliger and Pedahuzer (2011) note students appear to be reluctant in using SNA as “the majority of political 
violence students have very limited acquaintance with the rationale, main concepts, and methodological tools of 
SNA… and consequently tend to express doubt in regard to its efficiency and relevance for the study of complex 
social phenomena” (Perliger and Pedahuzer, 2011, pp:45). This unfortunate point leads to an oversight in the 
important, rich and meaningful results, that can be obtained in terrorism studies through the use of SNA. SNA is 
a research tool that is rarely included as part of the curriculum in social science departments at universities, with 
most students not even hearing about it well into their post-graduate studies. With the advances in technology, 
specifically the personal computer, there was a sharp ascent in SNA popularity which was the direct result of the 
development of SNA software, most notably UCINET, Pajek, NetMiner, STRUCTURE and MultiNet (Knoke & 
Yang, 2008). However, SNA remained a relatively nuanced research methodology within Terrorism and 
Security Studies, not often practiced by scholars. Having said this, there has been a small group of academics 
who have completed research in terrorism studies using SNA methodologies. 
 
Scholar Karl Van Meter, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York City used SNA, specifically Link 
Analysis to describe various forms of network research including adversary networks and traffic analysis in 
relation to phone surveillance. Van Meter’s study examined this topic by focusing on the US Army from World 
War II to the late 1960s, against the IRA in Northern Ireland in the 1970s and well into the modern era (Van-
Meter, 2001). By using SNA in the study of terrorism, Van Meter was able to identify weaknesses in certain 
terrorist networks which would otherwise not have been uncovered through traditional social science 
approaches. Going one step further, Kathleen Carley specifically targeted her research at destabilising covert 
networks. Through SNA networks she was able to identify weaknesses in the social networks and accurately 
develop strategies to combat and destabilise them (Carley, 2006). Similar to Carley (2006), Krebs (2002) points 
out the difficulty in mapping covert terrorist cells and offers insights into how SNA can be used in future 
research for this purpose (Krebs, 2002). However, as Perliger and Pedahuzer note, “even though their [post 
September 11 SNA scholars] studies showed strong potential in providing significant insights into the structures 
and internal processes of terrorist groups, the use of SNA in the study of political violence has remained quite 
limited and still amounts to only a small fraction of the research in the field” (Perliger & Pedahzur, 2011). One 
of the reasons scholars of Terrorism and Security studies have not been inclined to use SNA techniques is due to 
the assumption that Social Network Analysis is often hindered by difficulties in data collection. However, the 
rise of social media may be a solution to this problem. 
Social Media as a Data Source for SNA 
The use of Social Media as a data source in SNA has been growing over the last decade, since the rise of Social 
Media in general. The data is often gathered through data mining, using software specifically designed to 
pinpoint keywords, to more laborious methods, such as manually scouring hashtags, as in the case of twitter. 
However, with the large number of individuals participating in social media, creating, engaging with and 
disseminating networks, social media makes an excellent source for SNA data collection.  
 
Data collection methods vary from site to site; however common approaches can be identified. Sites such as 
Twitter and Instagram allow data to be collected directly from the application programming interface (API), such 
as the method used by Community Studies scholars Wayne Williamson and Kristian Ruming (Williamson & 
Ruming, 2016). Data collection through the API is also possible for the social network site Facebook, however 
recent important changes to the privacy permissions of the application have barred access to specific data such as 
the sharing of ‘Friend’s’ information. However, core data sets are still accessible within the Facebook API, 
allowing the researcher access to useful network data  Networks can also be traced and linked through hashtags, 
a type of metadata label which works similarly to a hyperlink but with a broader focus on social interaction 
(Chang & Iyer, 2012). Blogging works similarly in that social interaction and ‘sharing’ are key to the function of 
the site, allowing a data collector or researcher access to already established digital networks. Scholars have 
taken advantage of these large amounts of accessible data for research in varying disciplines such as Community 
Studies, Political Science, Psychology and Pedagogy. See (Norman, Nordin, Din, Ally, & Dogan, 2015), (Fu, 
Cheng, Wong, & Yip, 2013), (Williamson & Ruming, 2016) and (Lucente & Wilson, 2013). Having said this 
there has been little use of Social Media data combined with SNA techniques in the study of terrorism. 
 
While data collected through social media has been used in terrorism studies, it has rarely been integrated and 
analysed through SNA. It is well documented that terrorist propaganda, social networks and recruitment 
processes are disseminated through social media. However, the overwhelming majority of literature featuring the 
key words “Social Media” and “Terrorism” is concerned with the use of social media by terrorist organisations, 
rather than using social media as a data gathering tool to aid in the understanding and combat of terrorism. See 
(Dean, Bell, & Newman, 2012), (Marhu & Balteanu, 2014) and (Markon, 2016). Many academics, including the 
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above authors have documented the use of social media by terrorist organisations and how this creates a risk of 
online radicalisation to susceptible individuals. They also address the international network potential of terrorist 
groups and organisational prowess made possible by social media. However, as mentioned above there appears 
to be very little research that takes advantage of the relatively large radical and terrorist presence on social media 
as a data source for combatting terrorism and extremism.  
 
This paper identifies 3 key advantages of using Social Media data with SNA in terrorism studies 
1. International terrorist networks are easier to link together: While other methods of research into terrorist 
networks may be somewhat effective at identifying primitive links between key actors, they are rarely 
useful in mapping international connectedness.  
2. The majority of Social Media data is open-source: Due to the covert and confidential nature of 
terrorism, data collection is often limited to news reports and declassified government documents, 
which are often outdated and no longer relevant. Social Media data, for the most part, is open to any 
individual with the abilities to mine it. This coupled with the large use of Social Media by terrorist 
organisations exposes a gold-mine of terrorist network data 
3. Social Media Mining circumvents the risks of field research: Due to the violent nature of terrorist 
groups, ethnographic field research often comes with great risks to the researcher’s well-being. While 
this method of research offers extensive and important ethnographic data, it is often very dangerous and 
thus rarely undertaken. Social Network data mining and SNA can be completed externally, with extra 
protection possibilities provided through secure servers and networks. This method of research 
eliminates the dangers experienced by the field researcher and allows for more varied and automated 
data gathering techniques. 
With this in mind, it is also important to outline the disadvantages of using Social Media data with SNA in 
terrorism studies. SNA being a quantitative research methodology misses out on the detailed subject centred 
approach that qualitative studies offer. Ethnographic studies for example while limited in their scope, offer a 
much more detailed analysis of the human experience involved in terrorism. The other key disadvantage evident 
is the fact that not all terrorist organisations use social media. This can lead to a gap in data, which can cause 
misleading analyses. Having said this, specific research methods should not be used in isolation. SNA and Social 
Media Mining should be used as a complimentary research approach. Combining qualitative and quantitative 
research methods can lead to a more rounded approach to studying terrorism, therefore the disadvantages of 
SNA and Social Media Mining should not be seen as a problem when appropriately complimented. 
These above mentioned three key advantages of coupling Social Media Mining with SNA as a research 
methodology position the researcher at a key advantage to others in the field of terrorism studies. 
IMPLICATIONS 
Data gathered from social media sites and applications can be integrated in SNA to produce insightful analyses 
into various aspects of extremism and terrorism. This coupling can provide invaluable insights into the network, 
power relations, distribution patterns and radicalisation trends of terrorist networks. Additionally, the advantages 
are not limited to analysis and understanding, they also offer integral practical applications. Through 
understanding the structure and most importantly, the key relations within terrorist social networks, researchers 
and security agencies will be able to effectively identify vulnerabilities in the network, which could ultimately 
expose opportunities to destabilise networks as a counter-offensive tactic. Thus, the use of Social Media data in 
SNA can be employed in counter-terrorism as well. Several variables must be addressed during the planning and 
operational stage of such research; therefore, this paper will not publish such results here. However, this paper 
hopefully exposes important and useful techniques in understanding terrorist networks for future research to 
explore, allowing for a more in depth discussion on the analytical capabilities of the coupling of SNA with social 
media mining. 
CONCLUSION 
The analytic capabilities of SNA in Terrorism Studies are invaluable, however there is a peculiar lack of research 
done using SNA techniques. This appears to come down to a lack of in-depth conceptual understanding of the 
methodology. However, by combining the data mining resources of Social Media, a domain which is populated 
by many terrorist organisations, with the relation focused analytic capabilities of Social Network Analysis, we 
may be able to better understand and ultimately combat terrorist networks which threaten national and global 
security. This article offers only a brief outline of the capabilities of the proposed research method, but hopefully 
illuminates possible approaches to terrorism that may be adopted by future researchers as well as law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies. 
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Abstract 
Electronic transfer of prescriptions is an essential element of electronic medications management. Unfortunately, 
current manual and preliminary electronic transfer of prescription methods are not patient focussed, leading to a 
suboptimal solution for the patient. This is increasingly relevant in the push for more patient engagement in their 
own healthcare. The area is highly controlled by legislation and regulation. Through research and an analysis of 
the possible methods to improve and personalise electronic transfer of prescriptions, this paper provides an 
overview of these conclusions, and presents an alternative technical solution. The solution has been derived from 
a number of experiments in data transfer techniques using a mobile phone. The paper explains how this meets the 
current regulations and legislation, as well as providing a patient centred approach to the problem. Ultimately, 
healthcare outcomes will improve where patients are given the opportunity and the tools to better engage in their 
own healthcare management, and secure electronic transfer of prescriptions with patient access to their own 
medication lists may improve compliance and reduce healthcare costs.  
Keywords 
ePrescription transfer, ePrescription security, mobile transfer of ePrescription, eTP, mobile eTP 
INTRODUCTION 
The use of electronic prescription (eTP) is the lifeblood of eHealth and in improving quality of care through 
better medication compliance, improved prescribing accuracy and efficiency while reducing the adverse drug 
events. In fact, electronic prescribing is an essential initial step of the electronic Medication Management (eMM) 
program which primarily focuses on improving medication-related outcomes through better quality and 
availability of medications-related healthcare information (“NEHTA Blueprint V2”, 2011). Having an effective 
medication management system in place improves medication compliance and reduces adverse drug events. A 
recent study indicates almost 70,000 hospital admissions per year are associated with adverse drug events and 
poor medication compliance/adherence. This significantly contributes to having undesirable patient outcomes 
such as hospital readmission or even loss of life (White, 2015). The use of eTP enables eMM to reduce these 
undesirable outcomes and to prevent excessive use of healthcare expenditure while providing better patient 
safety. 
Current eTP implementation converts the conventional manual prescription process/model to a digital equivalent 
using two Prescription Exchange Services (PES), Script Exchange from eRx and Script Vault from MediSecure 
(Htat, Williams, & McCauley, 2015a). Using these PES services, prescribers can upload the electronic copy of 
the prescription for later download and dispense by the pharmacies. The use of electronic prescription exchange 
not only connects the two major healthcare providers such as clinicians and pharmacists, but it also paves the 
way to create a national medication repository. Such a repository would allow clinicians, pharmacists, aged care 
facilities and hospitals to see a combined list of prescribed and dispensed medications regardless of how many 
different doctors and pharmacies the patient has visited. However, current implementation of eTP is an 
expensive operation to maintain as an ongoing process for the nation. The associated electronic prescription fees 
for each prescription downloaded from PES used to be as much as AU$ 0.85 prior to achieving the 
interoperability between the two PES services. Some negotiations and cooperation between the Commonwealth, 
the Pharmacy Guild and the two PES operators managed to reduce the electronic prescription fees to AU$ 0.15 
per eligible prescription. This electronic prescription fees has, so far, been subsidised by the Commonwealth 
through a series of Community Pharmacy Agreements (CPA). However, the section 6.1.3 and Appendix-B of the 
current agreement, Sixth Community Pharmacy Agreement (6CPA), states that funding from 1st July 2016 and 
onwards will be subject to a cost-effectiveness assessment by an independent health technology assessment body 
as determined by the Minister ("The Pharmacy Guild of Australia", 2015). Since the eligibility criteria for this 
subsidy can be tightened or amended to the disadvantages of the pharmacies (i.e. current eTP implementation 
being a pharmacy user-pay system) ("FAQs", 2016), exploration of cheaper alternatives with comparable 
security measures to the current use of eTP is commendable. 
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WHAT ETP STANDARDS AND SPECIFICATIONS MANDATES VS CURRENT 
ETPIMPLEMENTATION 
There are numerous standards and mandates regulating the management of medications in Australia. These 
include the Electronic Transaction Act (ETA) and various Acts and Regulations governing the Poisons and 
Therapeutic Goods. They have been repealed and/or amended at the Commonwealth as well as State and 
Territory level to accommodate the implementation of eTP in Australian healthcare. Figure 1 briefly depicts how 
these Acts and Regulations fit together to enable the current eTP implementation. It also demonstrates how the 
legislation and regulations in Australia are constructed and the complexity of this construction for eTP. The 
outermost circle represents the encompassing regulation for the entire nation. The next inner circle defines the 
regulations for each State and Territory amended as per jurisdictional legislative requirements. These two circles 
enable the use of electronic transactions at national, state and territory levels thus making the use of eTP and 
other electronic transactions possible. The third circle lists Acts and Regulations governing the Poisons and 
Therapeutic Goods for each jurisdiction which play a major role in enabling the use of eTP. The centre circle 
contains various standards and specifications developed reflecting those national and jurisdictional legislative 
requirements. It is named Dante’s 4 circles of eTP as the closer the circle is to the centre of the diagram the more 
eTP specific it becomes in a similar way the 14th century poet Dante Alighieri’s depiction of nine circles of hell 
(i.e. lower circles are for more severe sins). 
Medicines, Poisons and 
Therapeutic Goods Act 
2012
Poision Act 1964
Poisons Regulation
1965
Health (Drugs and
Poisons) Regulation
1996
Poisons and 
Therapeutic
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2008
Medicines, Poisons and 
Therapeutic Goods
Act 2008
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and Therapeutic
Goods Regulations
2008
Drugs, Poisons and 
Controlled Substances 
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(Poisons) Regulations
2011
Poisons Act 1971
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 ATS 4888.1 – 6 (2013)
 AS 4700.3 (2014)
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Electronic Transaction Act 1999
Electronic Transaction Act 1999
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Figure 1. Dante’s 4 circles of eTP 
The Commonwealth Electronic Transaction Act 1999 facilitates the use of electronic means and enables the use 
of electronic communications in dealings with government, business and community for the future economic and 
social prosperity of Australia. Various States and Territories amend/adopt this overarching Act to suit their 
jurisdictional legislative requirements. This jurisdictional ETA and various Acts and Regulations governing the 
Poisons and Therapeutic Goods for each jurisdiction dictate the requirements for eTP implementation in that 
jurisdiction. After all the eTP requirements of all jurisdictions have been considered, various standards and 
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specifications have been developed reflecting those requirements. Among these related standards and 
specifications, ATS4888 series and AS4700.3 primarily govern the implementation of eTP. Current eTP 
implementation developed in compliance with these standards and specifications is briefly depicted in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2: Current electronic prescription transfer model using PES (Htat, Williams, & McCauley, 2015a) 
Although ATS4888.2 of the ATS4888 series particularly emphasizes on the platform independent model, it also 
includes specific details on securing electronic prescription information from the security of the data-at-rest 
perspective. It mandates that the electronic prescription to be encrypted using a symmetric key derived from the 
Document Access Key (DAK) before being stored on PES. DAK is the barcode printed on the paper prescription 
created by any eTP enabled electronic prescribing system. The current eTP implementation also makes use of 
DAK for authorizing access to the prescription stored on the PES and decrypting it after being downloaded from 
PES. In addition, section 7.3.3 of the ATS4888.2 strictly prohibits storing of DAK or any of its derived key on 
any stable storage (i.e. non-volatile storage) unless they have been encrypted using 128 bit encryption. Further 
details on securing electronic prescription from the security of data-at-rest perspective can be found in sections 
5.3.3 - 5.3.4, 5.3.6 - 5.3.7 and 7.3.3 of the ATS4888.2. These sections provide an overview of the security 
mechanism implemented using the DAK for safeguarding prescription information. Figure 3 briefly illustrates 
how this security mechanism works. 
 
Figure 3: DAK usage for storage and retrieval of prescription with PES (Standards Australia, 2013, Figure 19) 
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On the other hand, although ATS4888.2 contains specific details on securing prescription information from 
security of data-at-rest perspective, it mentions very little on securing the prescription information from data-in-
transit (i.e. data in motion) perspective. Both sections 5.3.5 and 7.3.3 of ATS4888.2 mention that securing 
prescription information from data-in-transit perspective entirely relies on the security and encryption 
mechanism of the implementation platform and the eTP technical specification for that platform. Research on 
eTP to date has not encountered any other standard or specification which includes further details on securing 
prescription information from data-in-transit perspective. Security in this context appears to be solely relying on 
existing industrial standards and best practices. Current implementation of eTP (i.e. both PES services) 
implements the simple Subscriber-Provider pattern instead of publishing their service endpoints using Endpoint 
Location Services (ELS) service infrastructure (Htat, Williams, & McCauley, 2016). Moreover, current eTP 
implementation does not utilize other eHealth infrastructural components such as Health Identifiers (HI) 
Services. Unfortunately, this leaves current eTP implementation considerable room for future improvement from 
security perspective. 
Another disadvantage of the current eTP is its associated ongoing cost, the electronic prescription fees. Although 
the combined effort of the Commonwealth, the Pharmacy Guild and the two PES operators could reduce the fees 
to AU$ 0.15 per eligible prescription, it is still a taxing expenditure for the nation on the long run. A recent 
survey by eRx found that pharmacies using eRx are dispensing 753,000 electronic prescriptions per day with up 
to 25 prescriptions per second during peak periods. When dispensing 753,000 prescriptions per day, it will cost 
the nation AU$ 112,950 a day for electronic prescription fees alone. 
 
 
Figure 4. Number of prescriptions over 10 year’s period 
 
 
Figure 5. PBS expenditure over 10 year’s period 
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Using statistics from the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme website, figure 4 and 5 depicts the number of 
prescriptions and PBS expenditure over the past 10 years. Based on figure 4 and 5, it is evident that although the 
PBS expenditure fluctuate slightly, the number of prescriptions increased steadily over the decade. 
Unfortunately, this indicates that unless less expensive alternatives are explored and utilized, the on-going 
expense associated with the use of electronic prescription will only cost more in future with increase in volume. 
At present, electronic prescription fees has been subsidised by the Commonwealth through a series of 
Community Pharmacy Agreements. However, despite the fact that current eTP implementation being designed 
as a pharmacy user-pay system ("FAQs", 2016), which party (among prescriber, dispenser and patient) will 
actually be liable to pay for this on-going cost when it is no longer subsidised by the Commonwealth and the 
ramification of this potential change is yet to be witnessed. 
PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE MOBILE SOLUTION 
The proposed mobile electronic prescription transfer application was designed to be a cheaper, if not completely 
cost-free, alternative with comparable security measures to the current eTP implementation using PES. This 
proposed solution makes use of the patient’s smartphone as the secured transfer mechanism for transferring 
electronic prescription instead of using PES. Figure 6 roughly depicts how this model works and its simplified 
operations using the patient’s smartphone in place of PES services whilst the rest of the operations remain the 
same as in the current eTP system. 
 
Figure 6: Electronic prescription transfer model using smartphones (Htat, Williams, & McCauley, 2015a) 
In securing the prescription information from the security of data-at-rest perspective, this model also makes use 
of DAK for encrypting the electronic prescription prior to transfer (i.e. to the patient’s mobile device) and 
decrypting at the pharmacy end. However, in this model, the prescriber’s Electronic Prescribing System (EPS) 
also transfers the DAK together with the electronic prescription to the patient’s smartphone for storage and 
transportation instead of using PES. The DAK is then encrypted using a 128 bit symmetric encryption, in 
compliance with the section 7.3.3 of the ATS4888.2, by the mobile electronic prescription transfer application 
prior to being stored on the smartphone. Upon arriving at the pharmacy, the mobile electronic prescription 
transfer application on the smartphone decrypts the DAK and transfers it together with the electronic 
prescription to the pharmacy’s eTP enabled Electronic Dispensing System (EDS). This transfer is to be done via 
Bluetooth communication although earlier research was conducted with the intention of using NFC technology 
instead. Once both the DAK and electronic prescription have been transferred to the pharmacy’s EDS system, 
the rest of the eTP operations such as decrypting the prescription using DAK, dispensing the medication and 
updating the National Prescriptions and Dispense Repository (NPDR) will continue in the same way as if in the 
current eTP implementation (Htat, Williams, & McCauley, 2015b). For the repeat prescription scenario, the 
pharmacy’s EDS will update the prescription information on the smartphone via the mobile electronic 
prescription transfer application. This model is designed to have minimal impact on the prescriber’s EPS and 
dispenser’s EDS systems in straightforward operations (i.e. simple prescribe and dispense scenario with no 
script-owing or script-request). How this proposed model’s security mechanism works and how it differs from 
the one using PES can be seen in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7: DAK usage for storage and retrieval of prescription in proposed approach (Htat, Williams, & 
McCauley, 2015b) 
Since the prescription information is stored on the patient’s smartphone, despite both the DAK and the electronic 
prescription being securely encrypted, it is still vulnerable to loss due to loss of the device on which it is stored. 
To ensure this sensitive information does not fall into the wrong hand, the remote data-wipe feature can be 
implemented as part of the mobile electronic prescription transfer application using Cloud-to-Device-Messaging 
(C2DM) from Google on Android platform, Google Cloud Messaging (GCM) on iOS platform and Windows 
Push Notification Services (WNS) on Windows phone platform. This will enable the device owner to remotely 
delete the prescription data stored on the device. Currently all major mobile OS platforms such as Android, iOS 
and Windows support remote wipe features for scenario like this. 
From the security of the data-in-transit perspective, this proposed model relies on the Bluetooth’s inbuilt security 
measures and governing standards for securing the prescription information in a very similar way current PES 
implementation relies on the implementation platform and its relevant standards for the security of the data in 
transit (Htat, Williams, & McCauley, 2015b). 
DISCUSSION 
The primary objective of the proposed mobile solution is to provide a cheaper, if not completely cost-free, 
alternative with comparable security measures. Therefore, the proposed alternative mobile solution intends to 
achieve the same level of security assurance as the current eTP implementation using PES by fulfilling the same 
security requirements mandated by the same standards and specifications.  
Being a national eHealth facility, current implementation of eTP using PES is considered to have complied with 
the legislative requirements of all the jurisdictions within Australia. However, the study on how it complies with 
those requirements and to which extent it complies with those requirements leads to interesting findings. For 
instance, whilst sections 32A, 32B and Appendix-K of the Western Australia’s Poisons Regulation 1965 
describes the fairly detailed criteria of an approved electronic prescribing system by CEO, the clause "in a 
manner of writing approved by the Secretary." in section 26 (1) (b) of the Victoria's Drugs, Poisons and 
Controlled Substances Regulations 2006 implies the use of electronic prescribing without further details on it. 
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Moreover, whilst the sections 37 (1A) (1B) and 51 (1A) (1B) (1C) of the Western Australia’s Poisons 
Regulation 1965 explicitly state the exemption from the requirement of prescriber’s signature on electronic 
prescriptions, sections 33 (5) and 34 (3) of the South Australia’s Controlled Substances (Poisons) Regulations 
2011 only mention that prescribers with adequate arrangements for the electronic transmission of prescriptions 
are permitted to transmit prescriptions electronically and it will be deemed to have been signed. Whilst one Act 
or regulation dictates something explicitly, the others imply the same meaning using somewhat catch-all 
statements and vice versa. Therefore, from the legislative approval/acceptance perspective, it is expected that the 
proposed mobile solution will be accepted as a viable alternative if it complies with all the same standards and 
specifications as the current eTP using PES. 
From the security of the data-at-rest perspective, the proposed solution also makes use of the symmetric 
encryption key derived from the DAK for securing the electronic prescription in the same way current eTP 
implementation using PES services does. This limits the impact of the change in transfer mechanism (i.e. 
patient’s smartphone instead PES) on other components of the eTP process such as prescribing, dispensing and 
updating NPDR etc. Then, in the proposed solution, the DAK is encrypted using a 128 bit symmetric encryption 
according to section 7.3.3 (i.e. Data Security Conformance Points) of the ATS4888.2 before being stored on the 
mobile device (Htat, Williams, & McCauley, 2015b). Since the proposed solution uses the same DAK for 
securing the electronic prescription and the DAK itself is stored encrypted according to the relevant security 
mandates, the proposed solution’s security measures are so far comparable to those of the current approach using 
PES. Moreover, in the same way the DAK scanned from the paper prescription is used for authorizing the 
pharmacy access to the prescription stored on the PES in the current eTP implementation, the DAK transferred 
from the mobile electronic prescription transfer application (i.e. the application from patient smartphone to the 
pharmacy’s EDS) authorizes the pharmacy to access the electronic prescription stored on the patient’s 
smartphone. Therefore, this authorisation mechanism of the proposed solution is also comparable to the current 
one being used. 
From the security of the data-in-transit perspective, the Bluetooth’s inbuilt security measures and governing 
standards upon which this proposed model depends on for securing the prescription information are well 
accepted by the industry and strictly governed by the Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG) and IEEE standard 
802.15.1-2005. With strict governance by these two reputable authority bodies (i.e. Bluetooth SIG and IEEE), 
the implementation platform specific security measures of the proposed model (i.e. using Bluetooth) can be 
considered comparable to those of the current eTP implementation using the Internet. 
Current eTP implementation using PES does not use any of the existing eHealth infrastructural components such 
as SMD, ELS and HI services although they can be effectively incorporated for better security, identification 
mechanism, consistency and reliability. Since the current approach using PES does not set very high standards 
for the proposed prescription transfer approach to live up to, this makes the proposed solution easier to 
implement and more acceptable to the industry. Although the primary objective of the proposed solution is to be 
a cheaper alternative with comparable security measures to the current approach using PES, it also has a few 
additional advantages over the current approach. First, this proposed solution puts the user in control of their 
sensitive information and allows them to prevent undesirable secondary use of that information by third parties. 
In addition, some useful features such as prescription expiration alert, last repeat alert, drug allergy alert and alert 
for harmful doses can also be implemented as part of the mobile electronic prescription transfer application. The 
ability to transfer the full history of patient’s medication from the patient’s mobile phone directly into the 
hospital system (i.e. once the interface has been implemented to integrate this mobile solution with the hospital 
information system) is just another benefit of this solution. Furthermore, without the requirement for the 
supporting network infrastructure this proposed solution will also be suitable for the remote regions of Australia 
where the network availability is limited or unreliable. 
CONCLUSION 
Before the 6CPA was officially signed, there were concerns and various speculations regarding what the new 
eligibility criteria will be for electronic prescription fees and how the subsidy will continue. Among them, eRx 
persuaded users with the no cost policy even for non-eligible scripts. But, some of its publications mention that it 
may not be able to maintain the cost neutral policy indefinitely but users would be given at least two month 
notice prior to any change being implemented to the price structure ("eRx slashes e-script pricing", 2010; 
O'Donoghue, 2012). So, effectively it does not even promise the users that it will remain cost neutral even with 
the current Commonwealth’s AU$ 0.15 contribution for each electronic prescription. How the use eTP will 
continue without the Commonwealth subsidy is rather an alarming thought. On the other hand, MediSecure 
seems to try using a scare tactics on users by implying that the eligibility criteria for electronic prescription fees 
will likely to be stricter in future ("How electronic prescription fee payment works?", 2015). For instance, from 
58
certain point in time during the 6CPA agreement period, the Commonwealth’s AU$ 0.15 subsidy will only be 
applicable if the PES can share data with other eHealth components such as PCEHR and NPDR. From that 
aspect, only their product, Script Vault, is capable of such enhancement with minimal disruption to the services 
as it is the only PES service that fully complies with various eHealth and HL7 standards. When the 6CPA was 
officially signed, the section 6.1.3 and Appendix B of the agreement state that from 1st July 2016 and onwards 
this funding will be subject to a cost-effectiveness assessment by an independent health technology assessment 
body as determined by the Minister ("The Pharmacy Guild of Australia", 2015). Therefore, instead of living in 
fear of the potential change in the Commonwealth’s subsidy for the electronic prescription fees, this paper 
proposed a cheaper (i.e. potentially cost-free) alternative with comparable security measures to the options 
currently available. 
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Abstract 
One of the challenges encryption faces is it is computationally intensive and therefore slow, it is vital to find 
faster methods to accelerate modern encryption algorithms to keep performance high whilst also preserving 
information security. Users often do not want to wait for applications to become responsive, applications on 
limited devices such as mobiles often compromise security in order to keep execution times quick.  Often they 
use algorithms and key sizes which are not considered cryptographically secure in order to maintain a smooth 
user experience. Emerging approaches have begun using a devices Graphics Processing Unit (GPU) to offload 
some of the computational burden from the Central Processing Unit (CPU) in an effort to parallelize and 
accelerate the encryption algorithms. Programming for a GPU often involves the use of CUDA or OpenCL 
programming, however these approaches are platform dependant. This research focuses on utilizing a GPU to 
perform in-browser cryptography using WebGL and JavaScript. This allows any GPU-enabled device capable 
of launching an OpenGL compatible browser to perform GPU accelerated cryptography. A GPU based 
implementation of the NTRUEncrypt algorithm was created and tested against a CPU based version on a range 
of hardware devices with results, challenges and limitations discussed.  
Keywords  
NTRUEncrypt, GPU, browser, cryptography, encryption, WebGL. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Cryptography is one of the tools available to facilitate secure communication between two parties. Whilst 
cryptography provides confidentiality of communications between the two parties, it also, when applied 
correctly, allows for integrity, authentication and non-repudiation (Rivest 1990). One issue with cryptography 
on mobile devices is that it is computationally expensive meaning when high speed networking is utilised the 
encryption and decryption of messages on the device can become a bottleneck for the message exchanges, 
slowing down the communication exchange.  
Whilst developments in cryptography has seen greatly improved security of cryptography with more 
sophisticated and robust encryption algorithms developed in the last few decades, the speed of encryption and 
decryption has suffered from the increased complexity of the cryptographic processes (Kapoor, Pandya et al. 
2011). The Central Processing Unit (CPU) of a device is fixed hardware that must handle complex calculations 
for the processing of many functions on the devices. The design of the CPU on mobile devices is deliberately 
conservative as it must be small, consume little battery power and produce minimal heat. It therefore tends 
towards being designed to provide high speed processing but at its limit of available processing power. This 
leaves little available processing power when complex additional computations are required for cryptographic 
processes.  
The GPU on a mobile device is required to deal with processing of graphical images which may at times require 
only a small percentage of the available processing power that the unit is capable of handling. This, along with 
the multiple processes within a single GPU mean that much additional processing power is available but 
generally not utilised. The ability to direct this additional processing power towards cryptographic requirements 
therefore has considerable benefits in permitting the most secure cryptographic algorithms to be utilised at high 
speed for message exchanges (Harrison and Waldron 2010). Whilst the idea of utilising the GPU of a device for 
processing of non-graphical requirements is not new, the restrictions that have been imposed by previous 
designs means that only a select few devices are capable of implementing this technology and reaping the 
benefits of the additional GPU processing power. This paper describes the development of a GPU accelerated 
NTRU Encrypt algorithm used for in-browser cryptography. It uses the WebGL and Three.js libraries for the 
purpose of trying to utilise the algorithm on any browser enabled device. 
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STATE OF THE ART 
The Data Encryption Standard ratified in 1977 provided a robust and reliable symmetric encryption algorithm 
suitable for public and government use. With only 56 bit encryption permitted to comply with the contemporary 
laws restricting encryption to this key size, Data Encryption Standard (DES) remained suitable until technology 
surpassed the protection afforded by such a small key length. Triple DES (3DES) acted as an intermediary fix to 
provide significantly stronger encryption without the need for an entirely new algorithm. However, 3DES was 
computationally expensive and with security weakening as computer processing increased rapidly, the 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) was developed in 1998 as a result of a competition for a replacement for 
DES and 3DES (Daemen and Rijmen 2003). Both 3DES and AES are commonplace and whilst AES is much 
preferred, 3DES remains as the encryption algorithm of choice for many banking applications. AES is 
computationally expensive which for computer applications is suitable but for mobile devices with much less 
processing power can slow message exchanges in some circumstances.  
In 2015, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) announced that it could no longer support 
continued use of the 2 key 3DES version and recommended utilising 3 key 3DES or move to AES (Barker and 
Barker 2004). The banking industry has been slow to respond and 2 key 3DES remains in many banking 
communications, however the move to AES seems inevitable as more and more research into the insecurity of 
DES in all varieties appears. 
The need to accelerate AES and other encryption processing on these devices has seen some improvements 
through new processes but so far all restrict the new processes to specific hardware. In 2007, experiments with 
accelerating AES by utilising a GPU showed significant improvements with bulk processing of AES (Harrison 
and Waldron 2007). The same year saw further experiments with AES and DES which achieved improvements 
of over 100% throughput with a GPU compared to a high performance CPU (Yang and Goodman 2007). In both 
of these experiments the limiting factor for improved processing was found to be the memory bandwidth rather 
than the GPU processing units on each card as each card required the same number of memory fetch units. In 
2012 experiments by Chesebrough and Conlon showed a significant increase in cryptographic processing of 
AES-NI of 5 times greater than previous experiments (Chesebrough and Conlon 2012).    
The move to parallel computing has seen great benefits in processing speed but at the expense of heat generation 
(Oancea, Andrei et al. 2014). Technology has moved rapidly from the original 8086 processer with 29 000 
transistors to the Intel core i7-920 released in 2014 with 731 000 000 transistors to 1.9 billion transistors by 
2015, all within approximately the same sized footprint of the CPU (Kowaliski 2015). Whilst multiple cores 
have somewhat alleviated the heat generation problems, the computing power requirements have increased at a 
greater rate than development so that higher performance from software remains ahead of the CPU development 
(Oancea, Andrei et al. 2014).  
The area for greatly improved processing power at little cost is in Graphical Processing Unit utilisation as a 
defacto CPU. Nvidia GPUs utilise Single Instruction Multiple Data (SIMD) stream architecture which has the 
advantage over Single Instruction Single Data (SISD) of providing natural parallelism and therefore processes 
data simultaneously (Nvidia 2008). Nvidia’s modification of SIMD is termed Streaming Multiprocessors (SM) 
and places emphasis on ease of development by reducing the complexity of the design. This has seen significant 
research in the area of GPU accelerated cryptography tied to Nvidia’s hardware because of the simplicity with 
which developers can utilise development platforms such as Compute Unified Device Architecture by NVidia 
(CUDA), (Yang and Goodman 2007). 
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 Figure 1: CPU v GPU processors (Nvidia, 2008) 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the main difference in processing of a CPU compared to a GPU is that a CPU may 
consist of several cores with a control bus for communication meaning that the CPU does not perform in a truly 
parallel manner. The GPU is made up of many floating point units, with each unit dedicated to performing 
arithmetic tasks and when combined in a truly parallel manner produce a truly SIMD architecture which is 
considerable faster than the CPU. In 2008 an Nvidia 8800 GTX was utilised as it allowed for the use of DirectX 
10, CUDA and a 32 bit integer processor (Harrison and Waldron 2009).  They noted the necessity of taking into 
account different memory architectures to improve performance as whilst there is some local storage available, 
most is off-chip making transfers comparably slower. The competing architecture is OpenCL (Open Computing 
Language) and there has been significant research into utilising GPU’s of each type but specific to the type 
being accelerated. This emphasis on writing software to accelerate the Nvidia architecture or the OpenCL 
architecture has meant that developments work for one technology but not the other.  
Accelerated programming has become a necessity not just because of the increased speed of computing 
applications but because of the greatly increased expectations of the users. In 1994, Nielson’s research found 
that 0.1 seconds of latency after performing a task such as selecting a key on a keyboard or dragging the mouse 
pointer across a screen could be considered instantaneous. Similar research by Ritter et al in 2015 found that 300 
milliseconds was acceptable as a maximum latency with 170 milliseconds required for more urgent tasks (Ritter, 
Kempter et al. 2015). 
The issue with acceleration of processing by utilising the GPU has potential to be overcome by the 
implementation of acceleration in JavaScript. All modern web browsers support the use of JavaScript (Flanagan 
2011) and with the introduction of HTML5 JavaScript has moved from a simple scripting language to an 
efficient programming language. With a doubling of Internet connected devices occurring every two years 
(Gartner 2015) , the motivation to improve processing speeds on mobile devices becomes very apparent. An 
early attempt in 2012 to implement JavaScript on a GPU utilising OpenCL rather than the Nvidia architecture on 
an Intel i7 processor proved unsuccessful at accelerating the processing but did prove that it was technically 
possible to at least do so (Nicholls 2012). One benefit of a successful implementation is that client side 
acceleration of processing functions could occur efficiently, alleviating some of the burden of the processing 
from the servers. The first investigation into utilising the GPU for accelerating cryptographic functions using 
JavaScript occurred in 2006 (Cook and Keromytis 2006). Their experiments targeted the AES algorithm but 
problems were experienced in the areas of a lack of modular arithmetic, unsigned integers, branching and large 
integers. Yang and Goodman directly furthered the experiments and gained some positive results primarily 
because of the development of the technology in the 1 year period (Yang and Goodman 2007).  In that time, 
branching and unsigned integers no longer proved difficult to handle but large integers remained a problem. 
Two years later, experiments of a similar nature but with asymmetric cryptography also showed some positive 
success but with some limitations (Harrison and Waldron 2009). Their research involved accelerating 1024 bit 
RSA encryption and they were able to show higher throughput and decreased latency by utilising the Nvidia 
GPU. Since 2010, little advancements have been made in accelerated cryptography utilising the GPU although 
hardware advances have made the area far more promising for success. 
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This issue with all of these previous experiments remained that they were all targeted to a particular type of 
GPU architecture, either Nvidia or OpenCL but not both. To be universally beneficial, what is clearly needed is 
software in JavaScript that will accelerate cryptography in both architectures. The following section outlines the 
research design for the software development.  
RESEARCH DESIGN 
This research used an experimental research design methodology which allows for control over the variables 
defined in the experiment, allowing more accurate results to determine relationships between sets of data. The 
purpose of running experiments with software that is developed to improve performance over currently 
available software is to show that the new scheme has benefits over previous schemes. A performance 
benchmark of what is currently available is one method of showing that improvements have been made with the 
new scheme by way of comparison between the older and the new scheme. Crypto++ has been chosen as the 
cryptographic scheme to be used in the comparison. Crypto++ is an open source library of several cryptographic 
algorithms and the version that is used in this research provides for AES encryption.  Utilising the JavaScript 
software and RSA (Rivest, Shamir et al. 1978) cryptography as well as Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) 
(Koblitz 1987). The JavaScript is run encrypting NTRUEncrypt and the resulting data used to compare against 
previous schemes.  The hardware utilised for the testing can be divided into 3 distinct types, mobile, desktop and 
laptop, and server. These are shown in the following tables (Table 1 and 2) as well as the CPU, GPU, RAM and 
operating systems used. 
Table 1: Mobile platforms tested 
 
Table 2: PC desktop platforms tested 
 
Initial tests were run to check that the systems were working as expected and results were being correctly 
recorded. Once this was satisfied, the experiments could begin.   
TESTING & RESULTS 
This research focused on utilizing the GPU in an attempt to optimize NTRUEncrypt (Hoffstein, Pipher et al. 
1998) algorithm for in-browser cryptography.  In order to target a variety of different devices, a Javascript 
version of NTRUEncrypt was developed using Three.js, which is a cross-browser library using WebGL and is 
primarily used for computer graphics. The experiments compared both Javascript CPU and GPU 
implementations of NTRU encrypt to test whether it could be beneficial to utilize the GPU for in-browser 
cryptography.  Average throughput results after 500 iterations for each version of NTRU on the various 
platforms were recorded and compared.  Porting an algorithm to GPU brings a number of challenges in order to 
port the algorithm to be more suitable for the GPU pipeline such as reducing code branching, fixing float values 
to between 0-1 within the GPU, and floating point precision errors. There is also limits on the buffer sizes and 
number of uniform values that are passed into the each shader.  NTRUEncrypt is was used as it is considered to 
be fast compared to other asymmetric encryption algorithms (Hermans, Vercauteren et al. 2010) with 
comparable security settings and “quantum resistant” (Perlner and Cooper 2009), making it an ideal choice for 
future cryptography systems.   
The algorithm was first tested with small set NTRU parameters (N=11) and progressing upwards to higher sets 
(N=1499, ees1499ep1) which become more computationally intensive to encrypt. The following values 
represent NTRU parameter sets considered to be cryptographically secure (Figure 2) (Inc 2014). 
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Figure 2: Recommended NTRU parameter steps 
The following GPU pipeline diagram (Figure 3) shows the parts to the implemented algorithm. The first stage of 
the pipeline takes in the public key and blinding values as byte arrays into the convolution shader. The output of 
which is then fed into the second shader where a polynomial addition modulo by the value q is performed on the 
plaintext to get its corresponding ciphertext.  
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Figure 3: NTRUEncrypt GPU pipeline model 
Because of the SIMD nature of GPU, the algorithm utilized vec4 operations within the GPU meaning that 
processing four blocks of plaintext can be converted to four ciphertext blocks with little to no extra 
computational cost over simply converting one block.  The GPU implementation of NTRUEncrypt was tested 
and compared to a pure CPU implementation also implemented in Javascript and used as a benchmark 
comparison.  The following table (Table 3) shows the results for the ees401ep1 parameter set on custom 
desktop.  
Table 3: GPU vs CPU average throughput results in milliseconds for ees401ep1 
 
Unfortunately it appears that no outright acceleration was achieved and in fact the algorithm execution time was 
significantly slower.  This is because the nature of the algorithm for NTRU is difficult to parallelize, in 
particular the polynomial addition part of the algorithm. The algorithm took on average 2.1mS to encrypt one 
block of plaintext for the CPU implementation whereas the GPU implementation took on average 230.5mS to 
encrypt four blocks of plaintext held inside a vec4 buffer. Custom desktop was only able to handle ees401ep1 
parameters due to the restrictions of OpenGL set on the GPU.  The results are also affected by the setup time for 
Three.js and overhead on WebGL calling shader instances as it is simply meant to be a graphics library and not 
intended for high performance computing and cryptography.  Furthermore hardware issues affected results due 
to their poor implementation of WebGL as although it is stated that it is OpenGL compliant, not all the 
standards are met.  Furthermore the mobile devices tested also failed to perform the algorithm correctly due to 
lack of float buffer support. 
However the following graph (Figure 4) shows results performed on the HP Elite desktop and demonstrates that, 
utilizing the GPU becomes advantageous when using the ees1449ep1 parameter sets for higher security levels as 
using a pure CPU approach becomes computationally burdensome using parameter sets over ees887ep1.  
Interestingly using very low spec parameters for NTRU on the GPU was slow compared to higher specification 
parameters, this is due to under-utilization of GPU cores.  Furthermore only the original NTRUEncrypt 
algorithm was implemented, (Inc 2014) has suggested several enhancements to the algorithm which may be 
advantageous for reducing computation time for encryption/decryption on GPU. 
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Figure 4: CPU vs GPU average throughput results on HP Elite desktop for increasing NTRU parameter sets 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The ability to accelerate cryptography on limited devices is essential in order for applications to use encryption 
schemes which are considered cryptographically secure whilst still maintaining a smooth user experience.  This 
paper looked at utilizing the GPU for in-browser cryptography using NTRUEncrypt as a case study.  Not all the 
hardware platforms tested were able to accelerate the NTRUEncrypt algorithm, however the HP Elite Desktop 
was able to achieve GPU acceleration with the ees1449ep1 parameter set.  Browsers poor implementations of 
WebGL affect performance in calling shaders for non-graphics purposes, however with the rise of GPU 
implementing compute shader pipelines then using GPU for non-graphics purposes could become more 
commonplace.  Modern browsers will see the implementation of WebGL 2.1 in the near future which will have 
direct support for compute shaders (Jackson and Gilbert 2015).  Using compute shaders is more useful for 
utilizing the GPU for non-graphics tasks such as high performance computing and cryptography.  Future work 
will investigate using compute shader further by trying to improve throughput performance of a GPU-based 
NTRUEncrypt algorithm. A preliminary C++ implementation with the full OpenGL pipeline, utilizing compute 
shaders has been developed with beta results that are promising.  The implementation was able to process four 
blocks of plaintext using the ees1499ep1 parameters in 18mS on the HP Elite Desktop. This is a significant 
improvement compared to the 80mS shown in this papers in-browser GPU JavaScript version.  This shows that 
the ability to use GPU to accelerate cryptography algorithms has the potential to increase security and 
intelligence capabilities. However there is still a long way to go in order for it to be fully supported by browsers 
so it can be then used for in-browser cryptography.  For now applications could still benefit from GPU 
acceleration by creating a direct port into the compute shader pipeline or using platform dependant alternatives 
such as CUDA or Open CL.  
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Abstract  
This research utilises a comprehensive survey to ascertain the level of social networking site personal 
information disclosure by members at the time of joining the membership and their subsequent postings to the 
sites. Areas examined are the type of information they reveal, their level of knowledge and awareness regarding 
how their information is protected by SNSs and the awareness of risks that over-sharing may pose. Additionally, 
this research studies the effect of gender, age, education, and level of privacy concern on the amount and kind 
of personal information disclosure and privacy settings applied. A social experiment was then run for 3 months 
that tested SNSs users’ reaction to a profile access request by a stranger. The research focused on four different 
social networks: Facebook, Twitter, Instagram,and Snapchat. The results of the survey and experiment found 
that there is a significant amount of personal information disclosure, but that the level differs between social 
networks. It is reveals that gender, age, and education have significant influences on information disclosure and 
user’s privacy settings and that on most sites over 50% of friend requests were readily accepted. These results 
are a selection from a comprehensive study of some of the more revealing facts about SNS user ship covering 3 
months of data collection and almost 500 responses.  
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INTRODUCTION  
Social media and social networking sites (SNS) are now utilised by a large majority of Internet connected 
people around the world. With the benefit of almost instant communication to potentially billions of other 
people, the temptation may be to connect as simply and as quickly as possible to enjoy the benefits of social 
media. With benefits, there are often drawbacks and the recent publicity of privacy breaches, identity theft and 
the dangers of over-sharing, social media users signing up for and utilising the sites’ service should be wary of 
just how much information they disclose. Of the many SNS’s available to consumers, Facebook, Twitter, 
Snapchat and Instagram are currently the most heavily visited sites. Each site has a user’s conditions that are 
available to be read when a new user creates an account with the site. Often, these agreements may not be fully 
read or fully understood yet many users agree to the terms and continue to enter personal details to create their 
account. Some sites have publicly available areas where non-members r general members who have had no 
prior contact with a user’s page can view information posted by the member. At times, this information may be 
of a personal nature that some members may wish to keep private or may be sufficient information to identify a 
person, a place of residence or other uniquely identifying feature. It has been argued that advances in 
communication technology have made people more tolerant and more willing to share information about 
themselves in a way that renounces the value of privacy in order to be more connected and traceable, 
specifically among younger generations (Tubaro, Casilli & Sarabi, 2014). Whilst much data exists regarding the 
numbers of people utilising social media, often on a daily basis, the makeup of the users in relation to their 
privacy settings and disclosure has been rarely examined.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Technological advancement has become less focused on connecting computers and more concerned about 
connecting people. A main contributor to this evolution is the use of social networking sites (SNS), which has 
seen explosive growth in use in the last couple of years (Zheleva, Terzi, & Getoor, 2012). As of August 2016, 
there are more than 2.22 billion users of SNSs (Statista, 2016).  Due to the increasing popularity of SNSs and 
the drive to reach customers, more than 70% of businesses are now using SNSs (McKinsey Global Institute, 
2012).  Although SNSs provide a powerful tool to engage people over the web, they can be a source of possible 
threats to users’ privacy and security because users routinely and voluntarily provide personal information 
(Cross, 2016). 
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Social networks initially started as websites where users only access to them was with a laptop or a desktop. 
However, with the advancement of smartphones, social networks released mobile application versions of their 
sites and other social networks developed mobile standalone applications for access. This development made it 
easier and more convenient for users to access their online profiles and update more actively and in real time 
(Aldhafferi, Watson, & Sajeev, 2013).  However, the more accessible the social network, the easier it is to be 
used and the more information the user tends to share (Coyle & Vaughn, 2008). SNSs have unquestionably a 
strong social impact and the line between a person’s virtual and offline life may for some, become blurred. 
SNSs have evolved over the years and have gone through many phases of development to reach their current 
state (Hendricks, 2013). The first recognisable form of SNS that encouraged users to include personal 
information about themselves for the purpose of social networking emerged in 1997 with a site called 
SixDegrees (Boyd & Ellison, 2007). It allowed users to open personal accounts and create a list of friends. 
SixDegrees attracted over a million subscribers at its peak (Chapman, 2009). However, although SixDegrees 
managed to become popular and attract large numbers of subscribers, the site was not able to maintain its 
popularity (Boyd & Ellison, 2007). In 2001, SixDegrees.com was shut down. According to the founder of 
SixDegrees, the failure of his website was due to the fact that SixDegrees was ahead of its time: at that time, not 
many people had friends who were online and the idea of being online friends with strangers had not yet gained 
universal acceptance (Prall, 2010). 
The concept of creating a virtual SNS inspired other developers (Liu, 2014). In the early 2000s, more people 
started to have Internet access, hence the target audience became much broader. This helped the success and 
increased the popularity of SNSs such as Friendster, which has attracted more than 90 million users. It 
introduced the ability for users to discover their friends and then friends-of-friends, and thus expand their 
networks and share more information with others.  
The vast spread of SNSs started to occur at the start of 2003, initially when Myspace was launched, which grew 
to be the most popular SNS in the world at that time (Boyd & Ellison, 2007).  Myspace differentiated itself from 
other competitors by giving users the freedom to customise the look of their profiles. In 2004, Facebook was 
launched initially as a Harvard-only social network and became the most popular SNS in 2008, overtaking 
Myspace. As of the second quarter of 2015, Facebook has 1.49 billion monthly active users (Statista, 2016). 
Facebook managed to maintain its success by constantly improving the site and by adding new features 
(Hendricks, 2013).  
At the present time, hundreds of SNSs have emerged, each designed to serve a different audience or have a 
different style that distinguishes it from other SNSs.  Figure 1 shows the vast growth of SNSs from 2006 to 
2012. 
 
Figure 1: Growth of Online Social Networks, 2006-2012. (Source: White, 2013) 
As of August 2016, there are over 2.34 billion social network users globally. This number is expected to 
increase and reach 2.95 billion social networks users by 2020, which is close to a third of the world’s entire 
population (Statista, 2016). The last decade has witnessed a rapid growth in the number of individuals using 
SNSs. For instance, as of June 2016, Facebook was regarded as the third most used website globally after 
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Google and YouTube (Alexa, 2016). Although SNSs provide many benefits for individuals such as keeping in 
touch with friends and family, privacy and security is regarded as a critical issue that can threaten the users of 
SNSs (Donath, 2007). This is mainly because SNSs encourage their users to reveal a great deal of personal 
information about themselves by promising them a better user experience if they do so (Luo, Liu, Liu, & Fan, 
2009). For example when users first sign up to Facebook, they will be constantly asked and reminded by 
Facebook to update their profile with more personal information such as date of birth, hometown, workplace, 
and/or school in order to find more friends and enjoy the experience better (Lewis, n.d.). The growing 
popularity of SNSs and the fact that they contain enormous amounts of information make these websites an 
attractive target for malicious hackers. It is therefore vital that users are aware of the risks of disclosure of 
personal information and how the information they disclose can be used by unscrupulous individuals to commit 
crimes such as Fraud and other scams. 
 
The following section discusses the research phases including design of the questionnaire. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
The aim of this research is to shed the light on SNS user’s personal information disclosure behaviours, their 
privacy protection settings, privacy policies and users SNS privacy knowledge and awareness. The study was 
conducted to identify the effect of gender, education status, and age on the degree of personal information 
disclosure and protective privacy settings applied by the user, using factor analysis. Four most common SNS 
sites were selected as a cross section of social media sites, each giving a different purpose for the members and 
viewers of the sites, from primarily text based to primary video and graphics based sites. These sites are 
Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and Snapchat. An online survey was conducted which aimed to answer the 
following proposed research questions.  
 
Q1: What are the personal attributes that can have an influence on information disclosure and privacy settings 
of SNS users? 
Q2: Do users’ levels of privacy concern have an effect on the amount of information they disclose in social 
networking sites? 
Q3: Are users aware of how their information is protected by SNS providers according to the privacy policies 
that the users have agreed to? 
In addition, a further experiment was conducted to test how users react to stranger’s friendship of follow 
requests. In this experiments, requests were sent to people the requestor had no prior personal knowledge of to 
ascertain how likely it was that the friend request would be accepted. 
 
Initially an online form was created with the link to the form posted on each of the four sites. In Twitter, for 
example, the link for the survey was tweeted with trending hash-tags in order to ensure it had wide exposure. In 
the post, there was a brief description of the survey in order to encourage users to take part in it. For the social 
experiment, users were selected randomly from their participation in public pages such as newspapers or public 
figures’ pages by either liking a post or commenting on a post. With a population of the four sites combined 
reaching approximately 1.5 billion users, the confidence level of 95% and margin of error of 5% was found to 
be appropriate. This meant that a minimum of 385 responses would be required for the survey to have this 
validity.  
 
Two stages of analysis were used in this research to derive the main findings.  
 
1) Exploratory data analysis (EDA): In this stage, the data files are viewed before completion of the data 
collection in order to get some ideas about the initial results. The purpose of this stage is that it may 
indicate further data are required: for instance, there may be more female responses than male 
responses, which could affect the accuracy of the results. This preliminary stage ensured that any 
imbalances and limitations in the data were resolved before the end of the data collection period. This 
stage overlaps with data cleaning because anomalies can become evident. Therefore, in an optimal 
situation, before the end of this stage, there should be a clean dataset that is ready for the next stage of 
analysis. 
 
2) Deriving the main findings: This stage generates a summary of the findings, relationships, trends, 
interpretations and narratives. When analysing the data, the type of questions dictate the type of 
analysis. However, in general, two tools are used together to analyse the data. The first tool is filtering, 
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which is provided by Survey Monkey to help break down the results in order to focus on a specific data 
subset. It allows viewing specific respondents’ answers to specific questions. For instance, it allows 
viewing of all the answers of male respondents who are between the ages of 20-24 years and who 
answered that they do not trust SNS providers with their information. Secondly, the information is 
transferred into SPSS in order to analyse it statistically. Factor analysis has been conducted. Separate 
chi-square tests of contingencies were conducted in order to understand and determine the differences 
in user privacy setting behaviours and personal information disclosure variables with gender, age, 
education, and privacy rating for each of the four social networks. All chi-squares were interpreted at a 
conservative alpha of .01 to control for multiple tests. The chi-square analysis helps to determine 
whether two discrete variables have any statistical association and whether there is a statistical 
significance between the variables. 
RESULTS   
The survey was run from January 2016 to March of that year and 415 people completed the survey. The first 
question in the survey was: Which of the following Social Networking sites do you currently have an active 
account with and use? (Check all that apply). The purpose of having this question at the start was to disqualify 
any non-SNS users and to identify what SNSs the survey participant was currently using. The results revealed 
that Snapchat was the dominant SNS among the four networks, with a response rate of 69.6%. Snapchat is the 
newest social network between the other three networks. Facebook, which is one of the oldest SNSs, had the 
lowest percentage of users in this survey at 55.9%.  Table 1 represents the findings and the rankings of the SNSs 
by the survey participants.  
 
Table 1: Chosen SNSs by the users in the sample  
Answer Choices Responses 
Facebook  55.90%     N=232 
Twitter  56.87%     N=236 
Instagram  60.96%     N=253 
Snapchat  69.64%     N=289 
None  3.37%       N=14 
Total Respondents: 415 
   
 
The next results looked at the membership of the four sites broken down into gender to identify if gender played 
a role in choice of sites to join. Figure 2 shows that a majority of males (75.52%) in this sample used Facebook; 
however, females used Facebook the least and Snapchat the most with 79.02%. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Male vs. Female Choice of SNS 
One question was designed to determine the reason behind a user becoming a member of the site. With the 
growing acceptance of SNS’s, this question looked at why people joined and was useful for also inferring why 
many people who are regular Internet users continue to resist joining sites. 
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Figure 3: Motivation for using sites 
 
Figure 4 displays the frequency of SNS use by the survey participants. It shows that most of the members are 
frequent users of SNSs, with 82.9% being daily users.  
 
 
Figure 4: Frequency of site visits 
 
Figure 5 presents the findings of the question “Is the privacy of your information on Social Networking sites a 
major concern for you?” The purpose of this question was to establish the value of online privacy for the user, 
which can affect their answers to other questions. For instance, if someone is not very concerned about the 
privacy of their information online, they will likely not be so stringent in applying protective privacy and 
security settings to avoid leakage of information. In addition, people who value their privacy and are more 
concerned about their information will probably not share as much personal information compared to those who 
are less worried about privacy.  
 
 
 
Figure 5:Scale of concern over privacy 
The results showed that there was a lack of trust in SNS providers with regard to storage and protection of users’ 
information, as 66.3% of the survey respondents answered that they did not trust their providers with their 
information. These findings will be used later in this chapter to compare users’ actual actions with their levels of 
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personal information disclosure and examine the ways they apply privacy settings to protect their information 
and online identity. If users are disclosing personal information, then one method to hinder the use of 
information by unscrupulous individuals is to use fake or partially fake identities. Figure 6 shows the percentage 
of members who use their genuine name, fake name or partially fake name such as a genuine first name with a 
fake surname. 
 
Figure 6: Name disclosure in Facebook, Snapchat, Instagram and Twitter. 
 
The next results looked at the information disclosure and privacy settings members used on the four sites. The 
Facebook results are indicative of the four sites and indicate the varying level of disclosure people are willing to 
make. More personal information tends to be kept private on the sites and more generic information such as the 
city of residence tends to be more freely disclosed.  
Table 2: Facebook: Personal information disclosure and privacy settings 
 
 
Public Friends Customised 
group of 
friends 
I don't share 
this 
information 
with others 
Total 
Respondents 
Hometown 53.9% 36.0% 
 
3.9% 
 
6.1% 
 
228 
Current city 52.8% 
 
36.7% 
 
4.8% 
 
5.7% 
 
229 
Family members 24.9% 
 
52.8% 
 
7.4% 
 
14.8% 
 
229 
Relationship status 29.3% 
 
50.7% 
 
4.8% 
 
15.3% 
 
229 
Birthday 41.3% 
 
47.8% 
 
3.5% 
 
7.4% 
 
230 
Education 44.5% 
 
45.4% 
 
3.5% 
 
6.6% 
 
227 
Events 26.3% 
 
59.2% 
135 
5.7% 
 
8.8% 
 
228 
Locations visited 24.3% 
 
 
55.7% 
 
4.3% 
 
15.7% 
 
230 
Friends List 26.8% 
 
54.8% 
 
6.6% 
 
11.8% 
 
228 
Contact Information 22.2% 
 
50.0% 
 
7.0% 
 
20.9% 
 
230 
Instagram is a site dedicated to allowing members to post pictures and videos. The site allows for a brief 
description of the graphic or video allowing members a choice of how much information about the posting they 
wish to disclose. Table 3 shows the results for this site. 
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Table 3: Instagram: Types of personal information posted  
 
 
Yes No Total 
I post pictures/videos of myself 55.7% 44.3% 271 
I post pictures/videos of family members/friends 58.7% 41.3% 269 
I include the real location of my pictures/videos 69.4% 30.6% 271 
Sometimes I post a photo with my house location in the map 39.8% 60.2% 269 
I include contact information in my profile 59.6% 40.4% 270 
Does your profile picture contain a picture of yourself? 60.0% 40.0% 160 
 
The next series of questions in the survey focuses on the awareness of users of the security policy wordings and 
the implications of accepting the site’s agreements. Much research has been done on users’ lack of careful 
reading of acceptance policies and the results in table 4 indicate that users generally trust that the site will 
protect their personal information. Careful reading of the policies tends to indicate otherwise in many cases with 
some sites quite clear that any information, graphics or videos can be reproduced by the site or passed on for 
any reason without the users permission. 
Table 4: Facebook privacy policy awareness question: response frequency 
Statement Proportion of survey participants who 
do not believe that this statement is true 
Collect and use all the information they receive about 
you to suggest advertisements for you 
78   (33.6%) 
Track your web surfing anytime you're logged into the 
site 
43   (18.5%) 
Use your public information, such as your profile 
picture, in ads without asking you first and without any 
compensation to you 
45   (19.4%) 
Collect information about your device locations, 
including specific geographic locations, through GPS, 
Bluetooth, or WiFi signals 
59   (25.4%) 
None of the above 132   (56.9%) 
 
 
With the increasing publicity about the risks of over-disclosure of personal information to strangers, many SNS 
sites are responding by providing much tighter privacy settings for their users. Several sites now prevent 
graphics searchers to their sites so that a simple search for a picture found on the Internet, even directly 
downloaded from one of these sites, will often result in no matches on the site. These types of additional 
security are designed to protect their users from stalking and identity theft. However, these measures only 
provide greater resistance to these types of criminal acts if users are cautious about whom they permit to view 
their private information reserved for ‘accepted’ friends. Table 5 shows the results from setting up a fake profile 
and then requesting to ‘friend’ these strangers. Strangers were chosen as randomly as possible by selecting 
pages during browsing of users’ sites. Results show that acceptance rates vary between sites but that 3 out of the 
4 sites have greater than 50% acceptance of these fake friends. 
 
Table 5: Acceptance rate for fake profiles on Snapchat, Facebook, Twitter and Instagram 
 Users added Users accepted the add Frequency of acceptance 
Snapchat 400 120 30% 
Facebook 400 245 61.25% 
Twitter 400 233 58% 
Instagram 400 224 56% 
 
The next point of interest was designed to ascertain generilastions from the four sites about whether gender 
played a significant role in how much personal information was disclosed. As an example which is 
representative of all sites, Facebook results are shown in table 6. These results indicate that gender does play a 
role in personal information disclosure with males more likely to disclose personal information than females in 
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every category. One interesting result from the survey is that in most cases there is no difference between the 
genders on accepting friend requests. It would appear from this result that the sociability of the members is 
something accepted by males and females equally. 
Table 6:  Facebook: Gender Chi-square description of results 
Attribute Results of cross -tabs and Chi Square analysis 
Hometown - Males more likely than females to be public 
- Females more likely than males to be friends 
- Females more likely than males to be “don’t share 
 
Current City 
 
- Males more likely than females to be public 
- Females more likely than males to be friends 
- Females more likely than males to be “don’t share” 
 
Family members 
- Males more likely to be public than females 
- Females more likely to “not share’ than males 
Relationship status 
 
- Males more likely to be public than females 
- Females more likely to “not share’ than males 
Birthday 
 
- Males more likely than females to be public 
- Females more likely than males to be friends 
Education 
 
- Males more likely than females to be public 
- Females more likely than males to be friends 
- Females more likely than males to “not share” 
Events 
 
- Males more likely than females to be public 
- No difference on friends 
- Females more likely to “not share” 
Locations visited 
 
- Males more likely than females to be public 
- No difference on friends 
- Females more likely to “not share” 
Friends list 
 
- Males more likely than females to be public 
- No difference on friends 
- Females more likely to “not share” 
Contact information 
 
- Males more likely than females to be public 
- No difference on friends 
- Females more likely to “not share” 
 
 
Finally, Snapchat results are shown in figure 6 for posting of personal photos and videos. Snapchat promises to 
permanently delete these photos and videos after a short time but there has been a greater public awareness 
recently that they are in fact quite easily recoverable from devices that have viewed these items and that the site 
owners generally retail rights to these often very personal photographs. Results indicate that females are much 
more likely to post pictures of friends and family members and that younger people tend to be much less 
concerned by posting these types of personal family and friend pictures and videos.  
Table 6: Snapchat Chi-square analysis results for posting pictures/videos that include family members/friends 
  Yes No 
Gender Male 74(56.9%) 56(43.1%) 
 Female 122(77.7%) 35(22.3%) 
Age 16-24 119(75.8%) 38(24.2%) 
 25-34 61(62.9%) 36(37.1%) 
 35+ 16(47.1%) 18(59.9%) 
Education High school 41(83.7%) 8(16.3%) 
 Bachelor 104(68%) 49(32%) 
 Masters 42(59.2%) 29(40.8%) 
 Doctoral 9(60%) 6(40%) 
Privacy Rarely/Never 42(84.0%) 8(16%) 
 Sometimes 46(60.5%) 30(39.5%) 
 Mostly 44(67.7%) 21(32.3%) 
 Always 64(66%) 33(34%) 
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CONCLUSION 
The results from the survey are a selection of several of the more interesting points taken from the findings. The 
questionnaire comprised of over 30 different questions with many diverse areas of SNS privacy investigated. 
This selection of results shows that many factors comprise the profile decisions of users and those who choose to 
join as members. The publicity over the risks of disclosing private information that may be used to construct fake 
profiles, stalking and other nefarious activity seems to have had little effect on many SNS users. The desire to be 
part of a community, often with hundreds of friends, most of which the person will never meet and who 
themselves may be using fake identities, seems to have only a modest effect on the users’ sense of caution. The 
results indicate that people are generally willing to use real names, disclose personal attributes such as dates of 
birth and hometown locations and often post personal pictures that could identify themselves, family members 
and friends. The use of privacy settings where only ‘friends’ can view posts, videos or pictures is largely negated 
by the ready acceptance of both males and females to accept friend requests from people whom they have no 
prior knowledge of and no method to ascertain the genuineness of the identity or desire to follow them. These 
results indicate that whilst the messages about the risks of over-disclosure are regularly repeated, most social 
networking site users are making their own decisions about what they wish to disclose and often these decisions 
are not fully informed by the reading the user agreements and are putting users at risk because of their desire to 
belong to these communities and share their information with strangers.    
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Abstract 
The purpose of automated traffic light systems is to safely and effectively manage the flow of vehicles through 
(usually) urban environments. Through the use of wireless-based communication protocols, sets of traffic lights 
are increasingly being connected to larger systems and also being remotely accessed for management purposes, 
both for monitoring and emergency purposes. These protocols, however, were not designed with security as a 
primary requirement, thus systems may operate with sub-standard or non-existent security implementations. This 
research aims to test if the same issues and vulnerabilities that appear to be present in traffic light systems in the 
USA are prevalent in Australia, specifically, Perth. There is evidence of weaknesses in traffic systems in Eastern 
Australia and by undertaking this research the conjecture that the same weaknesses may be present in Perth 
traffic systems can be answered. While none of three common wireless protocols (ZigBee, Bluetooth or Wi-Fi) 
were found to be in-use, the discovery of a large, consistent network pulse warranted further investigation at one 
specific intersection. 
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Wireless Protocol, Critical Infrastructure, Cyber Security  
INTRODUCTION  
Traffic lights have existed in some form for over a century, with the first coloured signal light system appearing 
in 1914 in London, England (Helmer, Meth, & Young, 2015), consisting of two semaphore arms lit by gas 
lights. Mueller (1970) notes that by 1915 parts of America were trialling a similar system except it incorporated 
electric lights and contained a small rotary compressor to blow a whistle, a method well-established at the time 
by on-duty policemen to control traffic. In 1920 the first three-light (Red, Amber and Green) system was 
installed in Detroit, Michigan and represents the beginning of what would be conventionally recognised as the 
modern traffic light.  
These early lights are somewhat unsophisticated compared to the traffic lights in use today. Mladenovic (2012) 
states that traffic lights are now part of a much larger system that is controlled by a central computer using 
programs such as SCATS (Sydney Coordinated Adaptive Traffic System) or SCOOT (Split Cycle Offset 
Optimisation Technique). These systems can measure traffic volumes used in road sensors and adjust light 
timings to allow for the most efficient flow of traffic, not only in a single set of traffic lights, but throughout a 
whole city. 
The motivation for efficient movement of traffic is simple:  traffic jams cost time and therefore money.  Hodson 
(2014) estimates that the combined economic loss from traffic congestion for France, the UK, Germany and the 
USA will increase from USD $200 billion in 2013 to $293 billion by 2030.  The total economic losses equate to 
$4.4 trillion over this 17 year period. These figures represent both the direct (cost of fuel and time wasted) and 
indirect costs (increased cost of doing business) caused by traffic congestion. The study predicts that the average 
hours wasted in traffic will increase by 6% by 2030. It also highlighted the environmental cost of this 
congestion, suggesting that in the four countries studied, idling vehicles released 15,434 kilotons of CO2 into the 
atmosphere and that this figure will increase to 17,959 kilotons by 2030. Therefore, any attack (cyber-based or 
otherwise) on systems that control traffic need only be moderately successful to have a large impact on the 
economic well-being of a country. 
Traffic systems are a vital part of the critical infrastructure of any city, and a city’s economic and social well-
being is dependent on the smooth movement of people and freight. It could therefore be assumed that any 
disruption to this system will have some form of impact. This does not have to be a major disruption to have a 
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potentially devastating effect, for example consider emergency vehicles not being able to get to where they have 
to be because they are caught in a traffic jam caused by a traffic system failure (Kelly, 2001).  
Cerrudo (2014) claims to able to hack into the traffic lights in several United States cities, including Washington 
DC and New York City, and potentially alter the timings of the signals. Cerrudo (2014) showed how to intercept 
the wireless signals that were being transmitted from a sensor node in the roadway to a traffic controller located 
on the road-side using commercial off the shelf tools. The specific system in question is produced and marketed 
by Sensys Networks which, according to their sales literature, is used extensively around the world including 
Australia (Ford, 2015). 
This research aims to test if the same identified issues and vulnerabilities that appear to be present in traffic light 
systems in the USA are prevalent in Australia, specifically, in the city of Perth.  The remainder of the paper 
describes some specific instances of traffic or traffic-related attacks, defines the experimental methodology used 
and discusses the findings of the research. 
SECURITY ISSUES IN TRAFFIC LIGHT SYSTEMS 
Much like the advancement of other service-based systems, traffic lights were not designed with security as a 
principal requirement. Early security of these systems revolved around physical isolation and proprietary 
protocols. However, with increased connectivity for remote management and operation, and the use of common 
protocols for interoperability, the security through obscurity paradigm no longer applies to these critical systems.  
There is limited peer-reviewed research on the security of traffic lights.  Estrin (2013) reports that in September 
2013 cyber-terrorists attacked the traffic system in the Israeli city of Haifa, targeting the security camera network 
on the Carmel Tunnels toll road with what was believed to be a Trojan malware programme. The attack was 
carried out sporadically over two days, resulting in the roadway being shut down during the peak hour period, 
and remaining shut for a period of eight hours on the second day. The resulting traffic jam not only caused long 
delays to the commuters caught in it, but could have other less visible flow-on effects.  These include the cost of 
any type of traffic congestion to business and risk to life should emergency vehicles be stopped or delayed by the 
traffic jam (Bernasek, 2014; Kelly, 2001, Schrank, Eisele, & Lomax, 2012). While this attack was an extreme 
case, with driverless cars currently in the trial phase, security issues in traffic light systems are a risk that will 
need to be managed, given the increased automated interaction between driverless cars and traffic light systems 
(Petit & Shladover, 2014). There has been limited research into the vulnerabilities of these systems carried out in 
the USA (Cerrudo, 2014; Ghena, et al., 2014), with very little consideration of whether these same 
vulnerabilities are present in systems used in Australia.  
A team from the University of Michigan (Ghena et al., 2014) investigated local traffic light systems. In the 
Michigan area, traffic light systems use induction loops below the ground to detect cars, which then 
communicate using wireless signals between the traffic controllers and the central server. The central server is 
capable of making modifications to the light timings dependent on the information it receives from the induction 
loop sensors, to dynamically avoid or alleviate traffic congestion. Each traffic intersection is treated as an 
individual isolated system, with communication and coordination between intersections undertaken using a 
central server. The protocol used for these wireless communications is a proprietary protocol similar to 802.11 
Wi-Fi; which presents an SSID visible from a normal laptop or smartphone. 
With the cooperation of a road agency in Michigan, Ghena et al (2014) went on to show that it was possible to 
compromise traffic lights in Michigan by using the communication radio signals used by the network. These fell 
into two ranges, 5.8GHz for short distance in-line signals and 900MHz for longer distances blocked by buildings 
or other obstacles. They found three major problems with these traffic communications: 
1. Wireless signals were not encrypted  
2. Default usernames and passwords were used 
3. Known exploits could be used 
These weaknesses allowed for attacks such as Denial of Service (DoS), timing manipulations to cause 
congestion and the ability to exploit these weaknesses while driving to ensure a green light wherever you go. 
It was shown that at least in these types of traffic controllers the more extreme claims of deaths or accidents 
resulting from all the lights turning green are highly unlikely unless physical access to the traffic control box can 
be achieved, because a hardware system is in place which stops this event happening. 
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Government Audits 
Similar to the US, there is little publicly-available information about the security of traffic systems in Australia. 
There have, however, been two Australian State Governments that have run audits on their traffic systems in the 
past five years, with both identifying a number of weaknesses (Gaskell et al., 2015; QUA, 2013). 
The Queensland Government audit undertaken before the 2014 G20 conference in Brisbane identified a lack of 
security understanding, and a wide range of security issues. The report states, “The traffic management systems 
for the Brisbane metropolitan area were not secure. If the systems were specifically targeted, hackers could 
access the system and potentially cause traffic congestion, public inconvenience and affect emergency response 
times. Such attacks could also cause appreciable economic consequences in terms of lost productivity. It was 
identified that these issues were caused due to increased connectivity between control systems and the Internet 
for remote management purposes” (QUA, 2013). A similar audit, released by the Audit Office of New South 
Wales in 2015 also found significant security issues in the traffic management system, stating that the risk 
management process put in place had covered the Transport Management Centre infrastructure, but the scope did 
not include the traffic network. Of note was one particular section of the road network, which had an identified 
lack of security and could lead to traffic disruptions, avoidable accidents or even the loss of life (Gaskell et al., 
2015). These audits did not disclose specific details of the vulnerabilities discovered, but it is clear from the 
findings that there were concerns as to the security of the traffic system at a holistic level. In response to these 
audits the relevant government departments of both states have stated that they have made, or are making the 
necessary changes to the systems, security practices and security education and awareness training for staff. At 
this time there is no evidence the WA government has audited the traffic control systems in Perth, in relation to 
their susceptibility to cyber-attack. The aim of this research is thus to investigate if wireless security issues of 
traffic sensors, identified in the US, and in operation in Eastern Australia, are in use and/or prevalent in Perth. 
RESEARCH METHOD 
The research was designed as a number of field experiments, where a combination of appropriate hardware and 
software resources were used to try and detect, capture and then analyse specific wireless communication used 
by a selection of traffic lights in Perth. Each step (hypothesis, defined in Table 1) is dependent on its precursor.   
The initial focus of this research was to ascertain if the same wireless security issues described by Cerrudo 
(2014) were present in traffic systems used in Perth. There was evidence that these systems are in use in 
Melbourne (“M80 FWY Management System”, 2012; “Sensys networks freeway solutions, Melbourne”, 2010), 
so there was a possibility that they could also be in use here in Perth. 
To answer the key research question, viz. “Could the same security concerns highlighted in America in regard 
to ZigBee be present in the traffic systems here in Perth?”, a number of hypotheses were proposed and are 
presented in Table 1. 
The research was focused on the way traffic light systems communicate at the intersection level and whether 
specific wireless communications, namely ZigBee, are used. ZigBee was selected because, whilst Cerrudo, 
(2014) did not specify the protocol he examined, it is clear from the evidence he presented that he protocol was 
ZigBee.  The field experiments to examine these communications were undertaken between March and June 
2016 at multiple traffic intersections in Perth. These intersections were chosen because they allowed easy and 
safe access and represented a cross section of the traffic lights in the eastern and western suburbs of Perth. 
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Table 1: Hypotheses to be tested 
 Hypotheses 
H1: ZigBee can be detected in use for wireless communication by traffic lights in Perth. 
H2: The ZigBee packets used by the traffic lights can be captured for analysis. 
H3: The ZigBee traffic used by the traffic lights is encrypted. 
H4: Default settings for authentication are being used by ZigBee traffic systems. 
H5: ZigBee traffic is susceptible to attack with the KillerBee framework. 
H6: New nodes can connect to the traffic system using zbassocflood to a point where the 
system overloads. 
H7: Legitimate commands can be sent to the traffic system using zbreplay and accepted.  
H8: Legitimate commands are accepted and can be used to change the timings of the traffic 
lights. 
 
Materials  
The initial aim of capturing transmitted packets involved passively sniffing at the traffic intersection; to do this 
the following equipment was used: 
1. HP Laptop (Pavillion dv6) with Windows 8.1 (64 bit) operating system 
2. VMware Workstation 12 Player virtual machine running Kali-linux-2016.1-amd64 
3. Wireshark version 2.0.1 installed as part of Kali-linux-2016.1-amd64 
4. Atmel RZUSBstick antenna configured to work with the ZigBee protocol 
5. KillerBee 1.0 Framework running on Kali-linux-2016.1-amd64 
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
According to Main Roads WA, Perth has over 850 sets of traffic lights in use throughout the metropolitan area 
(“Traffic Signals”, 2015). These traffic lights are controlled using SCATS and a typical layout for the overall 
system is shown in Figure 1, whilst Figure 2 shows a typical intersection layout. 
 
Figure 1:  SCATS Control Hierarchy Layout. 
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The intersections examined consisted of a series of in-road sensors (induction loops) that are connected to a road 
side control box, which is subsequently connected to both the traffic lights and the regional control centre.  
A car moving down the road is picked up by the in-road sensor, which sends this information to the roadside 
control box. The information is then sent back to the regional computer that performs an analysis, consisting of 
all the information provided by the other intersections in the area that it controls.  The stated configuration gives 
the regional controller an overview of traffic conditions in a wide area, allowing intelligent decisions to be made 
to adjust traffic light times accordingly. The most appropriate timings are then sent back to the roadside 
controller, which then implements the timings through  control of the associated traffic lights (Dineen & Cahill, 
2001). A central control centre manages the regional controllers, allowing oversight and manual manipulation of 
the system when necessary, such as in emergencies.  
 
 
Figure 2: Typical Traffic Light Road layout, retrieved from Agarwal (2013) 
Captures of the ZigBee protocol were attempted at ten different intersections in Perth, these tests being 
attempted on two separate occasions at each intersection and when possible, on different days and times.  No 
traffic was detected on any channel, thus disproving H1 and effectively invalidating the remaining hypotheses 
defined in Table 1.  This result led to a re-focusing and re-evaluation of the research goal whereby other 
common wireless protocols were examined.  The research question was re-framed as: 
“Is there any evidence that other wireless communication protocols are being used to transmit data between the 
components that make up an intersection set of traffic lights in Perth, specifically:  
a. Is Bluetooth (IEEE 802.15.1) used in the majority of traffic lights in Perth? 
b. Is Wi-Fi (IEEE 802.11) used in the majority of traffic lights in Perth?” 
Additional appropriate hypotheses were developed accordingly, to test the revised research question. 
In addition to the materials described in the previous section, extra hardware (an Ubertooth One antenna 2015-
10-R1) and software (Spectools -2015-10-R1) were utilised to enable detection and capture of these identified 
protocols. 
Testing was undertaken at the same intersections as the ZigBee testing.  A Spectools scan using the Ubertooth 
One was run at each intersection- a typical example being shown in Figure . The green line represents Bluetooth 
transmissions while the white lines are Wi-Fi. 
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Figure 3: Ubertooth spectral analysis, depicting Wi-Fi and Bluetooth Activity 
The Ubertooth One proved to be a useful spectrum analysis tool. It detected both protocols in the 2.4GHz range 
and displayed the traffic effectively. Although there were many transient devices at each intersection that were 
using Bluetooth (representing in-car systems and mobile phones used by pedestrians), there were no identified 
stationary Bluetooth devices at the traffic intersections (as the Bluetooth traffic did not have a static underlying 
pattern) based on the variable BD_ADDR identifiers detected during analysis. 
Similarly, the Wi-Fi signals found were identified as nearby houses or businesses from their SSIDs and signal 
strength. There was no evidence to suggest that the 802.11 protocol was being used by the traffic lights to 
communicate to either another intersection or the roadside control box. 
However, of note was a consistently identified network traffic pulse at one specific intersection. Upon further 
inspection of the surrounding traffic management infrastructure, a large antenna attached to the traffic light was 
identified as the source of the pulse. Spectral analysis was conducted on the pulse, but similar to other 
intersections, the pulse could not be classified as one of the investigated protocols, (ZigBee, Bluetooth or Wi-Fi), 
and thus was not captured or classified. The pulse occurred regularly at one-minute intervals, and was 
identifiable on two separate visits to the intersection, at similar times of day/days of week and peak traffic 
conditions. A third visit to the intersection resulted in no pulse being identified. While circumstantial, it should 
be noted that traffic conditions were much lighter during the third visit, which was conducted at a different time 
of day/day of week, compared to the previous two visits.  
CONCLUSION 
This research set out to look for the security flaws highlighted by Cerrudo (2014), in a traffic system that used 
in-road sensors connected via a wireless signal, namely ZigBee. As was outlined previously, there is some 
evidence that these systems are in use in Melbourne, but no such evidence was found in regard to the 
intersections investigated in Perth. The fact that there was no information on whether these systems were in 
service in Perth needed to be examined. The tools necessary for this examination were procured and testing was 
undertaken, however it became apparent that this protocol was not in use at the intersections tested. This result is 
a good outcome from a security viewpoint, considering traffic lights in Perth; if ZigBee is not being used it 
means it cannot be attacked via the methods outlined in Cerrudo (2014). This meant that the research project 
needed to be re-evaluated and modified to test a wider array of wireless protocols. Bluetooth and Wi-Fi were 
tested at the same intersections, using appropriate spectral analysis hardware and software. Similarly, there was 
no evidence of either Bluetooth or Wi-Fi being used by the traffic lights.  
Finally, the discovery of a large, consistent network pulse warranted further investigation to one specific 
intersection. Further examination using the spectral analyser showed that none of the common wireless protocols 
(ZigBee, Bluetooth or Wi-Fi) were in use, similar to in other intersections investigated. Whilst purely 
circumstantial, the change in traffic conditions and related change in signal emission does add some weight to 
the argument that the identified pulse signal is being used by the traffic lights to transmit information during 
peak traffic periods.  This is clearly an avenue for further research. 
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